Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Insurance Law
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Plaintiffs, limited liability companies, filed class action lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland seeking relief under the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) provisions. These provisions make Medicare a secondary payer when a beneficiary has other insurance coverage. Plaintiffs obtained assignments from Medicare Advantage Organizations and other secondary payers to seek reimbursement from primary payers like the defendants, Government Employees Insurance Company and its affiliates (GEICO). Plaintiffs had no preexisting interest in the claims and were compensated on a contingency basis.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied GEICO's motion to dismiss the case, which argued that the assignments were void as against Maryland public policy based on the doctrines of maintenance, champerty, and barratry. The court found no clear statement of Maryland law on this issue and certified questions to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that Plaintiffs did not violate Maryland’s barratry statute, which prohibits soliciting another person to sue for personal gain without an existing relationship or interest. Plaintiffs did not solicit secondary payers to file lawsuits but obtained the right to sue in their own names through assignments. The court also held that the common law doctrines of maintenance, champerty, and barratry, to the extent they still apply, do not invalidate Plaintiffs’ assignments. The court concluded that the assignments are not void as against public policy and did not address the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in the agreements. View "GEICO v. MAO-MSO Recovery II" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund (MIIF) seeking cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) payment reimbursements from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund). MIIF, a nonprofit entity created by statute, administers and pays certain claims against insolvent insurers. Between 1989 and 2013, MIIF paid workers' compensation benefits, including COLA payments, on behalf of several insolvent insurers. MIIF filed claims with the trust fund for reimbursement of these payments, but the trust fund denied the claims, arguing that MIIF is not an "insurer" under the relevant statutes and does not participate in the trust fund.The Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) administrative judge denied MIIF's claims, and the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board (board) affirmed the decision. The board relied on the Appeals Court's decision in Home Ins. Co. v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, concluding that MIIF, like the insolvent insurers, does not collect and transmit assessments to the trust fund and is therefore not entitled to reimbursement.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that MIIF is eligible for COLA-payment reimbursements. The court determined that MIIF, when taking on an insolvent insurer's covered claims, is "deemed the insurer" and has "all rights, duties, and obligations" of the insolvent insurer under G. L. c. 175D, § 5 (1) (b). The court also found that the plain language of the relevant statutes does not exclude MIIF from reimbursement eligibility and that the trust fund's funding mechanism, which is paid for by employers, supports MIIF's entitlement to reimbursement.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund" on Justia Law

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A group of businesses and individuals in the vision care industry challenged Texas House Bill 1696, which regulates managed vision care plans by limiting the information these plans can provide to their enrollees. The plaintiffs argued that the bill imposed unconstitutional burdens on their rights of commercial speech, associational freedom, and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the bill's enforcement and the defendants, Texas officials, moved to dismiss the case, claiming sovereign immunity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and granted the preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their commercial speech claims and that the equities favored a preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed both the denial of their sovereign immunity defense and the grant of the preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss as it related to Texas Insurance Commissioner Cassie Brown, finding that she had a specific duty to enforce the statute. However, the court vacated the denial of the motion to dismiss as it related to Governor Greg Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton, determining that they did not have a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the statute. The court also affirmed the preliminary injunction against Commissioner Brown, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their commercial speech claim and that the balance of equities favored the injunction. The court vacated the preliminary injunction as it applied to Governor Abbott and Attorney General Paxton and remanded the case for modification of the orders. View "Healthy Vision Association v. Abbott" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Pennsylvania Professional Liability Joint Underwriting Association (JUA), which was established by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nearly fifty years ago to address a medical malpractice insurance crisis. The JUA acts as a professional liability insurer of last resort for high-risk medical providers and is funded solely by premiums paid by its policyholders. Over the years, the JUA has accumulated a surplus of about $300 million through investments. From 2016 to 2019, the Commonwealth attempted to transfer the JUA’s surplus to the General Fund or assume control of the JUA through legislative actions.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case multiple times. In 2017, the JUA sued the Governor after the enactment of Act 44, which mandated the transfer of $200 million from the JUA to the General Fund. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction and later summary judgment in favor of the JUA, holding that the JUA was a private entity and that the Act violated the Takings Clause. In 2018, after the enactment of Act 41, which placed the JUA under the control of the Insurance Department and mandated the transfer of all its assets, the JUA again sued. The District Court ruled in favor of the JUA, reiterating its earlier decision. In 2019, the JUA challenged Act 15, which required the JUA to be funded by the Commonwealth and categorized it as a Commonwealth agency. The District Court granted partial summary judgment for the JUA, holding that certain provisions of Act 15 constituted a regulatory taking and violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and applied the principles from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward to determine whether the JUA is a public or private entity. The Court concluded that the JUA is a public entity because it was created to serve a public purpose, exercises the Commonwealth’s coercive power, and only the Commonwealth has a legally protectable interest in the JUA. Consequently, the JUA cannot assert constitutional claims against the Commonwealth. The Court reversed the District Court’s rulings in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania Professional Liability Joint Underwriting Association v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish, a political subdivision of Louisiana, which suffered property damage from Hurricanes Laura and Delta in 2020. The Police Jury had insurance policies with a syndicate of eight domestic insurers. The insurers sought to compel arbitration in New York under New York law for the approximately 300 property damage claims. The Police Jury alleged underpayment and untimely payments by the insurers and filed suit in state court, which was later removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.The Western District Court granted the Police Jury's motion to certify three questions of Louisiana law to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The questions concerned the validity of arbitration clauses in insurance policies issued to Louisiana political subdivisions, particularly in light of a 2020 amendment to La. R.S. 22:868 and the applicability of La. R.S. 9:2778, which bars arbitration clauses in contracts with the state or its political subdivisions.The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the certified questions. First, it held that the 2020 amendment to La. R.S. 22:868, which allowed forum or venue selection clauses in certain insurance contracts, did not implicitly repeal the prohibition of arbitration clauses in all insurance contracts under La. R.S. 22:868(A). Second, the court determined that La. R.S. 9:2778 applies to all contracts with political subdivisions, including insurance contracts, thereby prohibiting arbitration outside Louisiana or the application of foreign law. Third, the court held that a domestic insurer cannot use equitable estoppel to enforce an arbitration clause in another insurer’s policy against a political subdivision, as it would contravene the positive law prohibiting arbitration clauses in La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2).The Louisiana Supreme Court answered all three certified questions, maintaining the prohibition of arbitration clauses in insurance policies issued to Louisiana political subdivisions and affirming the applicability of La. R.S. 9:2778 to such contracts. View "POLICE JURY OF CALCASIEU PARISH VS. INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO." on Justia Law

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Nicholas and Stacy Boerson, owners of New Heights Farm I and II in Michigan, faced a disappointing corn and soybean harvest in 2019. They submitted crop insurance claims to Great American Insurance Company, which were delayed due to an ongoing federal fraud investigation. The Boersons sued Great American, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture for breach of contract, bad faith adjustment, and violations of insurance laws.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the Boersons' claims. It ruled that claims related to Great American's nonpayment were unripe due to the ongoing investigation, while claims alleging false measurements and statements by Great American were ripe but subject to arbitration. The court also dismissed claims against the federal defendants on sovereign immunity grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. It held that the claims related to nonpayment were unripe because the insurance policy barred payment until the investigation concluded. The court also found that the arbitration agreement in the insurance policy covered the ripe claims against Great American, requiring those disputes to be resolved through arbitration. Additionally, the court ruled that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the federal defendants, as there was no clear waiver of immunity for constructive denial claims under the Federal Crop Insurance Act. View "New Heights Farm I, LLC v. Great American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Elizabeth Holt, a former insurance agent for Medicare Medicaid Advisors, Inc. (MMA), alleged that MMA and several insurance carriers (Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare) violated the False Claims Act (FCA). Holt claimed that MMA engaged in fraudulent practices, including falsifying agent certifications and violating Medicare marketing regulations, which led to the submission of false claims to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed Holt's complaint. The court found that no claims were submitted to the government, the alleged regulatory violations were not material to CMS’s contract with the carriers, and the complaint did not meet the particularity standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court also denied Holt's motion for reconsideration, which introduced a fraudulent inducement theory and requested leave to amend the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Holt's allegations did not meet the materiality requirement under the FCA. The court applied the materiality standard from Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, considering factors such as whether the government designated compliance as a condition of payment, whether the violations were minor or substantial, and whether the government continued to pay claims despite knowing of the violations. The court found that the alleged violations did not go to the essence of CMS’s contract with the carriers and were not material to the government's payment decisions.The Eighth Circuit also upheld the district court's denial of Holt's motion for reconsideration and request to amend the complaint, concluding that adding a fraudulent inducement claim would be futile given the immateriality of the alleged violations. View "United States ex rel. Holt v. Medicare Medicaid Advisors" on Justia Law

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Nevada Health CO-OP, a health insurance provider, received two loans from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) under the Affordable Care Act’s CO-OP program. These loans included a start-up loan and a solvency loan. In 2015, Nevada Health faced financial difficulties and was placed into receivership by the Nevada Commissioner of Insurance. CMS subsequently terminated the loan agreement and began offsetting payments owed to Nevada Health against the start-up loan debt.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the Nevada Commissioner of Insurance, acting as the receiver for Nevada Health. The court found that the government improperly withheld statutory payments owed to Nevada Health under the ACA. The court also held that the government could not invoke 31 U.S.C. § 3728 to withhold these payments in the future.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment that the government improperly withheld payments owed to Nevada Health. The court held that the loan agreement subordinated the government’s claim to those of policyholders and basic operating expenses, thus precluding the government from asserting offset rights to jump ahead of these senior creditors. However, the appellate court vacated the portion of the lower court’s order that addressed the government’s ability to invoke 31 U.S.C. § 3728, ruling that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing this issue, which was not raised by the parties. View "Richardson v. United States" on Justia Law

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David Howard, a former coal miner, worked from 1978 to 1997, with his last employer being Apogee Coal Company, which was self-insured by Arch Resources at the time. Howard filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) in 2014. Initially, the District Director identified Patriot Coal Company as the liable insurer, but after Patriot's bankruptcy, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a bulletin directing that Arch Resources be notified as the liable insurer. Arch contested this designation but failed to submit evidence within the required timeframe.The District Director issued a Proposed Decision and Order (PDO) naming Arch as the liable insurer. Arch's subsequent motions for discovery and to hold the case in abeyance were denied by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Arch then appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. Arch petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review, arguing that the DOL's bulletin was a new rule requiring notice and comment, and that the evidentiary procedures violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Sixth Circuit denied Arch's petition for review and its motion to supplement the administrative record. The court held that the BLBA regulations, which require evidence to be submitted to the District Director within 90 days, were consistent with the APA and did not violate due process. The court also found that the DOL's bulletin did not constitute a new rule requiring notice and comment, as it merely provided guidance and did not alter any rights or obligations. The court concluded that Arch had received adequate notice and an opportunity to defend against its designation as the liable insurer. View "Apogee Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

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In this case, a private insurance company, TIG Insurance Company, sought to enforce two judgments against the Republic of Argentina. The dispute centers on whether Argentina, as the successor to a state-owned Argentine company, Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, is liable under reinsurance contracts that Caja entered into with TIG in 1979. TIG alleged that Caja failed to pay as promised under these contracts, leading to arbitral awards and subsequent judgments in TIG's favor.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Argentina, finding that Argentina's property was immune from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because it was not used for commercial activity at the time the writ would issue. The court also held that the Illinois district court lacked jurisdiction over Argentina for the 2018 judgment and that TIG needed to amend the 2001 judgment in Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in D.C. TIG appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that two FSIA exceptions—the arbitration and waiver exceptions—might apply. The court held that an agreement could be "made by" a sovereign if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate, even if the sovereign was not an original signatory. The court also found that implied waiver does not require evidence of subjective intent but can be based on objective actions, such as agreeing to arbitration or a choice-of-law clause. The court vacated the district court's decisions and remanded for further analysis and factfinding on these issues.The appellate court affirmed the denial of TIG's request for jurisdictional discovery and precluded TIG from advancing an alter ego theory or arguing that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive pleading. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's instructions. View "TIG Insurance Company v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law