Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group of 53 California hospitals challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (HHS) 2020 low-wage-index policy, which adjusted Medicare payment rates by inflating the rates for the lowest quartile of hospitals and reducing payments to all hospitals by a small percentage. The hospitals argued that the policy violated statutory provisions, was arbitrary and capricious, resulted from a faulty administrative procedure, and was unsupported by evidence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied HHS's motion for summary judgment, granted the hospitals' motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the Secretary without vacating the policy. The court held that HHS lacked authority to implement the low-wage-index policy under either the Wage Index Provision or the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision and found procedural defects in the policy's implementation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority in establishing the 2020 wage index. The court held that the low-wage-index policy did not "reflect" area differences in hospital wage levels as required by the statute and that the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision could not independently authorize the policy. The court also vacated the district court's decision to remand the case without vacating the policy, stating that when an agency cannot issue the challenged policy in another way, the only appropriate remedy is vacatur. Judge Nguyen dissented, arguing that the low-wage-index policy was consistent with the statutory text and that the majority's decision would have negative repercussions for vulnerable communities. View "Kaweah Delta Health Care District v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Lloyd Gerald Napouk was fatally shot by two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers after they responded to reports of a man behaving suspiciously in a residential neighborhood with what appeared to be a long, bladed weapon. The officers attempted to engage Napouk, who refused to follow their commands and advanced towards them multiple times. When Napouk came within nine feet of one of the officers, both officers fired their weapons, killing him. The weapon turned out to be a plastic toy fashioned to look like a blade.Napouk’s parents and estate sued the officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of familial relations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, and Nevada state law claims. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officers’ use of force was reasonable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Napouk posed an immediate threat to the officers, and no rational jury could find the officers’ mistake of fact regarding the weapon unreasonable. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because there was no evidence that the officers acted with anything other than legitimate law enforcement objectives. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation, and the state law claims failed because the officers were entitled to discretionary-function immunity under Nevada law. View "Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order. View "RABADI V. USDEA" on Justia Law

Grand Canyon University (GCU), a private university in Arizona, applied to the U.S. Department of Education to be recognized as a nonprofit institution under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The Department denied GCU’s application, despite GCU having obtained 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) recognition from the IRS as a tax-exempt organization. The Department concluded that GCU did not meet the operational test’s requirement that both the primary activities of the organization and its stream of revenue benefit the nonprofit itself.The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, upholding the denial of GCU’s application. The court found that the Department’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. GCU appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the Department applied the wrong legal standards in evaluating GCU’s application. Specifically, the Department incorrectly relied on IRS regulations that impose requirements beyond those of the HEA. The correct HEA standards required the Department to determine whether GCU was owned and operated by a nonprofit corporation and whether GCU satisfied the no-inurement requirement. The Department’s failure to apply these correct legal standards necessitated that its decision be set aside.The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to set aside the Department’s denials and to remand to the Department for further proceedings consistent with the correct legal standards under the HEA. View "GRAND CANYON UNIVERSITY V. CARDONA" on Justia Law

Several states challenged Executive Order 14026, which mandated a $15 minimum wage for federal contractors, and the Department of Labor (DOL) rule implementing it. The states argued that the executive order and the DOL rule violated the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) and the major questions doctrine, and that the DOL rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the states' complaint and denied their request for a preliminary injunction. The district court concluded that the wage mandate did not violate the FPASA, the major questions doctrine did not apply, and the rule was not subject to arbitrary-or-capricious review under the APA because the DOL had to adopt the policy by executive order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the minimum wage mandate exceeded the authority granted to the President and DOL under the FPASA because the FPASA’s purpose statement does not authorize the President to impose a wage mandate without other operative language in the FPASA. The court also held that the major questions doctrine did not apply because the executive order was not a transformative expansion of authority. Finally, the court found that the DOL acted arbitrarily or capriciously by failing to consider alternatives to the $15 per hour minimum wage mandate, thus violating the APA. View "STATE OF NEBRASKA V. SU" on Justia Law

Consuelo Griselda Nerio Mejia challenged the denial of her disability benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA). After an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her application, concluding that despite her severe impairments, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy, Nerio Mejia filed a civil suit. She raised three objections to the ALJ's decision, but the district court only addressed her claim that the ALJ improperly rejected her symptomology testimony, finding that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for doing so. The court reversed the ALJ's decision and remanded the case to the SSA for further proceedings.The United States District Court for the Central District of California found that the SSA's position was not substantially justified, making Nerio Mejia eligible for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). However, the district court reduced the fee award, excluding time spent on two additional issues that the court did not address, citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hardisty v. Astrue. The court concluded that fees for work on issues not decided by the court were not compensable under the EAJA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order reducing the fee award. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied Hardisty, which did not address the compensability of fees for undecided issues. The appellate court found that the district court's ruling was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart and the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Ibrahim v. United States Department of Homeland Security. These cases establish that a fully compensatory fee should be awarded when a plaintiff achieves excellent results, even if some issues were not decided. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to award the full amount of fees requested by Nerio Mejia. View "MEJIA V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the "metering" policy implemented by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the U.S.-Mexico border. Under this policy, asylum seekers without valid travel documents were turned away when ports of entry were deemed at capacity. Plaintiffs, including an immigrant rights organization and individual asylum seekers, argued that this policy unlawfully prevented them from applying for asylum. They also challenged the subsequent application of the "Asylum Transit Rule," which required asylum seekers to apply for asylum in a third country before seeking it in the U.S., to those turned away under the metering policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found the metering policy unlawful under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates that courts compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to those turned away under the metering policy before the rule took effect. The court also ordered the government to unwind past asylum denials based on the rule. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the APA § 706(1) and due process claims but did not reach the APA § 706(2) claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the metering policy violated § 706(1) of the APA, holding that noncitizens stopped at the border are eligible to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) and that border officials have a mandatory duty to inspect them under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The court also affirmed the classwide declaratory relief but vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim, deeming it unnecessary. The court affirmed the negative injunctive relief prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to class members but vacated the portion of the injunction requiring the government to reopen or reconsider past asylum denials on its own initiative, as it violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). View "AL OTRO LADO V. AMAYORKAS" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Montana House Bill 702 (HB 702), which prohibits discrimination based on vaccination status. Plaintiffs, including health care providers and individuals with compromised immune systems, argued that HB 702 is preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSH Act) and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought to invalidate HB 702 in all health care settings, claiming it prevents employers from knowing employees' vaccination status, thus hindering ADA-required accommodations and OSH Act compliance.The United States District Court for the District of Montana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that HB 702 is preempted by the ADA and the OSH Act and violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of HB 702 in health care settings, reasoning that the law conflicts with federal requirements for reasonable accommodations and workplace safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and vacated the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that neither the ADA nor the OSH Act facially preempts HB 702 in health care settings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine conflict between HB 702 and the ADA or OSH Act in any specific case, much less in all health care settings. The court also held that HB 702 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification and differential treatment of facilities could rationally reflect Montana's interest in balancing personal privacy and public health.The Ninth Circuit reserved judgment on whether the ADA and the OSH Act could preempt HB 702 on a narrower, as-applied basis in future cases. The court deemed moot the portion of the district court's order related to interim CMS regulations, as those regulations have been rescinded. The court concluded that HB 702 is not facially invalid under the ADA, OSH Act, or Equal Protection Clause and vacated the district court's injunction in full. View "MONTANA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law