Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several small businesses and a coalition of states challenged a series of executive orders issued by the President that imposed new tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods imported from most countries. These tariffs, referred to as the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs, were imposed in response to declared national emergencies related to drug trafficking and trade imbalances. The executive orders directed changes to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, resulting in significant increases in import duties on products from Canada, Mexico, China, and other major trading partners.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by imposing these tariffs. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose the challenged tariffs and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The government appealed, and the Federal Circuit consolidated the cases, stayed the injunction pending appeal, and heard the matter en banc.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate” importation does not include the power to impose tariffs of the type and scope at issue. The court found that IEEPA does not mention tariffs, duties, or taxes, and contrasted it with other statutes where Congress has explicitly delegated tariff authority to the President with clear limitations. The court also concluded that the government’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns under the major questions and non-delegation doctrines. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s declaratory judgment that the executive orders were invalid, but vacated the universal injunction and remanded for the CIT to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law

Shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, acting derivatively on behalf of these entities, challenged the federal government’s actions following the 2008 financial crisis. After the housing market collapse, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), creating the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorizing it to act as conservator for the Enterprises. The FHFA placed both entities into conservatorship, and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements to provide financial support in exchange for senior preferred stock and other rights. In 2012, a “net worth sweep” was implemented, redirecting nearly all profits from the Enterprises to the Treasury, effectively eliminating dividends for other shareholders. The plaintiffs, as preferred shareholders, alleged that this arrangement constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims previously reviewed the case and granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The Claims Court relied on the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, which held that, under HERA, the Enterprises lost any cognizable property interest necessary to support a takings claim because the FHFA, as conservator, had broad authority over the Enterprises’ assets. The Claims Court found the plaintiffs’ claims indistinguishable from those in Fairholme and dismissed them accordingly.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the Claims Court’s decision, holding that claim preclusion barred the plaintiffs’ derivative takings claims because the issues had already been litigated in Fairholme. The court rejected arguments that the prior representation was inadequate or that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County fundamentally changed takings law. The Federal Circuit concluded that Fairholme remained binding precedent and affirmed the dismissal. View "FISHER v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves Tau-Ken Temir LLP, JSC NMC Tau-Ken Samruk, and the Ministry of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (collectively, "Tau-Ken") appealing a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade. The U.S. Department of Commerce had determined that the Republic of Kazakhstan subsidized Tau-Ken’s production of silicon metal, warranting a countervailable subsidy rate of 160%. This determination was based on Commerce rejecting a Tau-Ken submission that was filed 1 hour and 41 minutes past the deadline.The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s decision, finding that Commerce did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the late submission and applying an adverse inference when selecting from facts otherwise available. The Trade Court likened the case to Dongtai Peak Honey Industries Co. v. United States, where Commerce had similarly rejected untimely submissions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce abused its discretion in rejecting Tau-Ken’s submission. The court noted that the rejection significantly impeded the goal of determining an accurate countervailable subsidy rate and that accepting the late submission would not have burdened Commerce or implicated finality concerns. The court also found that Tau-Ken had made diligent efforts to comply with the deadlines and that the technical issues encountered were legitimate.The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions for Commerce to accept the September 16 submission and proceed with the countervailing duty investigation accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of determining subsidy rates as accurately as possible and found that Commerce’s rejection of the submission was a clear error of judgment. View "TAU-KEN TEMIR LLP v. US " on Justia Law

Rodney Wright, a totally disabled veteran, sought additional compensation for his adult daughter, B.W., under 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F) after she elected to receive benefits from the Survivors’ and Dependents’ Educational Assistance (DEA) program. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) ceased paying Wright additional compensation for B.W. once she began receiving DEA benefits, citing 38 U.S.C. § 3562(2), which bars increased rates or additional amounts of compensation when a dependent elects DEA benefits.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Wright’s request for additional compensation, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision. The Veterans Court held that section 3562 permanently barred Wright from receiving additional compensation under section 1115 once B.W. elected to receive DEA benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the nonduplication provision of section 3562 bars a disabled veteran from receiving additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child begins receiving DEA benefits. The court also determined that this bar is permanent and does not lift after the exhaustion of DEA benefits. The court rejected Wright’s argument that the bar should only apply to concurrent receipt of benefits, finding no statutory basis for such an interpretation. The court concluded that section 3562 imposes a permanent bar on a veteran’s receipt of additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child elects to receive DEA benefits. View "WRIGHT v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, owners of bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA), sued the United States, alleging a taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment due to the enactment of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). They claimed that the restructuring of COFINA's debts under PROMESA resulted in a significant loss of the principal and interest value of their bonds and their security interest.The United States Court of Federal Claims determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case but dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The court found that the enactment of PROMESA by Congress did not constitute sufficient federal government action to support a takings claim. The court reasoned that the actions of the Puerto Rico Oversight Board, which was created by PROMESA and acted autonomously, could not be attributed to the United States as coercive or as an agency relationship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Claims Court. The Federal Circuit held that PROMESA did not displace Tucker Act jurisdiction, as there was no clear congressional intent to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. The court also agreed with the Claims Court that the United States did not exert coercive control over the Oversight Board's actions, which were necessary to establish a taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish that the United States was liable for the alleged taking of their property. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the Claims Court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint. View "DINH v. US " on Justia Law

Nikko Cerrone, a sixteen-year-old, received the Gardasil HPV vaccine, Flumist influenza vaccine, and Hepatitis A vaccine on October 7, 2015. He later reported decreased stamina and blood in his stools, leading to a diagnosis of ulcerative colitis (UC) in March 2016. He received a second HPV vaccine dose in February 2016 and a third in June 2016, with no documented reaction to the third dose.Cerrone filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, claiming the vaccines caused his UC. The Chief Special Master of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program denied his claim, finding that Cerrone failed to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Federal Claims upheld this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Cerrone did not meet the burden of proof required under the Vaccine Act. The court found that the special master correctly applied the legal standards and that the findings were not arbitrary or capricious. The court noted that the special master found the respondent's experts more credible and persuasive than Cerrone's experts. The court also upheld the special master's conclusion that the evidence did not support a proximate temporal relationship between the vaccinations and the onset of UC. The decision of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "CERRONE v. HHS " on Justia Law

Jilin Forest Industry Jinqiao Flooring Group Co. ("Jilin") is an exporter of multilayered wood flooring in China. In November 2010, the Department of Commerce ("Commerce") initiated an antidumping investigation into the sale of this product from China, treating China as a non-market economy ("NME") country. Commerce applied a presumption that all companies in an NME country are subject to government control and should be assessed a single antidumping duty rate unless they can demonstrate independence. Jilin successfully demonstrated independence and received a separate rate of 3.31 percent.In the fifth administrative review initiated in February 2017, Commerce selected Jilin as a mandatory respondent. Despite Jilin's cooperation, Commerce found that Jilin failed to rebut the presumption of government control and assigned it the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent. Jilin challenged this decision at the Court of International Trade ("CIT"), which questioned the lawfulness of Commerce's NME policy and ordered Commerce to calculate an individual rate for Jilin. On remand, Commerce calculated a zero percent rate for Jilin under protest, and the CIT entered that rate in its final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Commerce's practice of applying the NME presumption and assigning a single NME-wide rate to exporters that fail to rebut the presumption is lawful. The court cited binding precedents, including Sigma Corp. v. United States and China Manufacturers Alliance, LLC v. United States, which upheld Commerce's authority to use the NME presumption and assign a single rate to the NME-wide entity. The court reversed the CIT's decision, reinstating the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent for Jilin. View "JILIN FOREST INDUSTRY JINQIAO FLOORING GROUP CO. v. US " on Justia Law

Annette R. Deal served in the U.S. Navy and Army and filed a claim for compensation for Cushing’s syndrome and a nervous condition in 1991, which was denied in 1992. She received treatment within the appeal period, resulting in a 1993 medical record being added to her file. The VA did not address whether this record met the requirements to be considered new and material evidence until 2021. Mrs. Deal did not appeal the 1992 decision. She filed another claim in 1995, which was partially granted, and a third claim in 2003, leading to a 2016 decision granting service connection for her psychiatric disorder with an effective date of August 1, 2003.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted an effective date of March 10, 1995, for her psychiatric disorder, ruling that new and material evidence was presented in 1997. However, it denied an effective date of October 1991, ruling that the 1993 record was not material. Mrs. Deal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision, finding a plausible basis for ruling that the 1993 record was not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Mrs. Deal argued that the VA’s failure to address the 1993 record before the 2016 decision meant her 1991 claim remained open, entitling her to an earlier effective date. The court disagreed, stating that the VA’s delay does not automatically entitle a claimant to an earlier effective date unless the evidence is determined to be new and material. The court affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the 1993 record was not material and the 1992 decision was final. View "Deal v. Collins" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, a group of German steel companies, challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's determination of a 22.9 percent antidumping duty on their steel plate products. Commerce applied an adverse inference based on the appellants' failure to provide complete manufacturer information for certain sales by their affiliated reseller, which Commerce deemed necessary for calculating the dumping margin.The U.S. Court of International Trade (Trade Court) sustained Commerce's decision, finding that the appellants did not cooperate to the best of their ability. The Trade Court noted that the appellants failed to provide reasonable alternative forms of the missing information, which could have mitigated the burden of manually retrieving the data. The court suggested that a statistical analysis or randomized sampling could have been a reasonable alternative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that Commerce's request for the missing manufacturer information imposed an unreasonable burden on the appellants. However, the court also found that the appellants did not propose reasonable alternative forms of the missing data as required by statute. Consequently, Commerce's application of adverse facts available was deemed permissible.The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce's use of the highest non-aberrational net price among the disputed sales to fill the information gap, concluding that this approach was reasonable given the size of the information gap and the need to deter non-cooperation. The court found that Commerce's choice of adverse inference was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. View "AG DER DILLINGER HUTTENWERKE v. US " on Justia Law

Anthony Stuart, a Navy veteran, appealed a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that denied him credit for his military service in computing his civilian retirement annuity. Stuart served in the Navy during three periods between 1974 and 1991 and was placed on the Permanent Disability Retirement List in 1994 with a 60% disability rating. He later entered federal civilian service and retired in 2015. Stuart did not waive his military retired pay to receive credit for his military service toward his Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) annuity.The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) initially decided that Stuart’s military service was not creditable toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay. OPM explained that by statute, Stuart could not receive both military retired pay and FERS credit for his military service unless his military retired pay was awarded for specific reasons, which did not apply to him. Stuart sought reconsideration, but OPM affirmed its decision. Stuart then appealed to the MSPB, where an administrative judge upheld OPM’s decision, and the full Board affirmed, modifying the initial decision to clarify the analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that under 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(2), Stuart’s military service could not be credited toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay and did not meet any statutory exceptions. The court rejected Stuart’s argument that his military retired pay, calculated based on his disability percentage, was not “based on” his military service. The court found that the statute clearly barred double crediting of military service for both military retired pay and a civilian retirement annuity. View "STUART v. OPM " on Justia Law