Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, former officers of the City of Perris Police Department or their surviving spouses, claimed that the closure of the Perris PD and their subsequent hiring by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department resulted in a merger of the two departments under Government Code section 20508. They argued that this merger required Riverside County and the Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) to credit their service with the Perris PD as service with the Sheriff’s Department, entitling them to a more generous pension.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that section 20508 only applies when there is a merger of contracts between successive employing agencies and CalPERS. The court concluded that no such merger occurred because Riverside County did not assume any of the City’s municipal functions. Consequently, the service pensions for the Perris PD officers and the Sheriff’s Department deputies were calculated and paid out by CalPERS under separate contracts with the City and County, respectively. The court ruled in favor of the defendants, Riverside County and CalPERS.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that section 20508 requires an actual merger of the contracting agencies’ CalPERS contracts before the succeeding agency assumes any statutory obligations. The court found that the County did not assume the City’s municipal obligations but merely contracted to provide law enforcement services. Therefore, the requirements for a contract merger under section 20508 were not met. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the County and CalPERS were not required to treat the former police officers’ service as service with the Sheriff’s Department. View "Petree v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Jason Lee, an American citizen of Chinese ancestry, was employed by the FBI and held a Top Secret security clearance. After failing three polygraph examinations, the FBI revoked his security clearance and subsequently terminated his employment, as his job required such clearance. Lee contended that the revocation was based on race, national origin, and protected speech, and he brought claims under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and Title VII.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Lee's claims. It held that his Title VII claims were not timely exhausted, that Title VII preempted his Fifth Amendment claims against the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that Lee lacked a cause of action to press constitutional claims for damages against individual DOJ officials. The court also denied Lee's motion for leave to amend his complaint to include additional claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), barred judicial review of Lee's statutory and constitutional claims. The court reasoned that the decision to grant or revoke a security clearance is a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch. The court also found that Lee's constitutional claims were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, as they involved national security matters committed to the political branches and lacked judicially manageable standards for resolution. View "Lee v. Garland" on Justia Law

Richard Andrew Justice filed a claim against the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) for breach of an employment contract, alleging that DPS failed to pay him for overtime hours as required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Justice argued that the FLSA provisions were incorporated into his employment contract. The central issue was whether Justice had demonstrated the existence of a written contract sufficient to overcome DPS’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.The trial court allowed limited discovery and reviewed documents submitted by Justice, including a written offer of employment and subsequent communications. The trial court ultimately granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, finding that the documents did not constitute a valid written contract and that there was no meeting of the minds regarding FLSA overtime compensation provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the documents did form a written contract that included FLSA provisions, thereby waiving sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that Justice had shown the existence of a written contract with DPS, which established a waiver of sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Georgia Constitution. The Court held that the question of whether the FLSA obligations were part of the written contract was a merits question, not a sovereign immunity question, and thus was not properly before the trial court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. JUSTICE" on Justia Law

Eight former public-school teachers who retired from the Keene School District between 2012 and 2017 sought review of a decision by the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) Board of Trustees. They challenged the board's denial of their petitions for contribution and earnable compensation adjustment, arguing that the board erroneously found they consented to a 120-day delay in payment of early retirement stipends.The NHRS Board of Trustees had denied the petitions based on the finding that the petitioners consented to the delay in stipend payments. The board's decision was influenced by the fact that the petitioners did not file grievances or inquire with the NHRS about the delay at the time of their retirement. The board distinguished these petitioners from others who had successfully challenged the delay through grievances.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioners could not have consented to the delay because the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) did not authorize such a delay. The court noted that employees governed by a CBA cannot consent to terms that modify the agreement. The court also found that the petitioners were not at fault for the delay, as they were not informed that the delay would affect their pension calculations and had no reason to challenge the School District's policy at the time. Consequently, the court reversed the board's decision and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Petition of Retired Keene School Teachers" on Justia Law

Steve L. Michaud sustained a traumatic injury to his left eye on December 26, 2014, while working as an auto mechanic, resulting in an immediate loss of more than eighty percent of his vision. Michaud underwent multiple surgeries between 2015 and 2019 in an attempt to restore his vision, but these efforts were largely unsuccessful. In September 2021, Michaud filed petitions for an award of compensation and specific-loss benefits. A doctor’s report in October 2021 confirmed that Michaud had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) with a ninety-four percent vision loss in his left eye.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Michaud’s specific-loss benefits became due on October 14, 2021, the date of the doctor’s report, and ordered interest to be paid from that date. Michaud appealed, arguing that the benefits should accrue from the date of his injury in 2014. The Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) Appellate Division affirmed the ALJ’s decision, relying on the precedent set in Tracy v. Hershey Creamery Co., which held that specific-loss benefits for an eye injury are determined when the injury reaches a reasonable medical endpoint.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that Michaud’s injury immediately resulted in more than eighty percent vision loss and that his condition did not materially improve despite medical interventions. The court held that Michaud’s specific-loss benefits became due on the date of his injury, December 26, 2014, and that interest should accrue from that date. The court vacated the Appellate Division’s decision and remanded the case for entry of a decree ordering Michaud’s employer to pay interest from the date of the injury. View "Michaud v. Caribou Ford-Mercury, Inc." on Justia Law

Christian Greene, the Ombudsman for the District of Columbia Child & Family Services Agency (CFSA), was terminated from her position and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the District, claiming her termination violated the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Greene argued that her termination was in retaliation for her disclosures about CFSA's non-compliance with the Foster Youth Statements of Rights and Responsibilities Amendment Act of 2012 (FYAA).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of CFSA, concluding that Greene's disclosures were merely policy disagreements about the role of the Ombudsman and not protected under the WPA. The court did not address whether Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed unlawful activity or whether there was a causal connection between her disclosures and her termination.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that Greene's disclosures were indeed protected under the WPA. The court held that Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed violations of the FYAA, which required CFSA to report on the outcomes of investigations and ensure compliance with relevant laws. The court noted that Greene's belief was genuine and reasonable, given the evidence she provided and the context of her role.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court was instructed to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Greene's WPA-protected disclosures were a cause of her termination. View "Greene v. D.C. Child & Family Services Agency" on Justia Law

Robert Mayfield, a small-business owner operating thirteen fast-food restaurants in Austin, Texas, challenged the Department of Labor's (DOL) 2019 Minimum Salary Rule. This rule raised the minimum salary required to qualify for the White Collar Exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) from $455 per week to $684 per week. Mayfield argued that the DOL exceeded its statutory authority by imposing any salary requirement and that such a requirement violated the nondelegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL, finding that the 2019 Minimum Salary Rule was within the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption. The court also held that this delegation of authority did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption included the power to set a minimum salary level. The court found that this power was explicitly delegated by Congress and was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court also determined that the major questions doctrine did not apply, as the economic and political significance of the rule did not meet the threshold for invoking the doctrine. Additionally, the court concluded that the FLSA's purpose and the text of the exemption itself provided sufficient guidance to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine's requirements. View "Mayfield v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

A former chauffeur, Hyunhuy Nam, filed a lawsuit against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, alleging violations of federal, state, and city wage-and-hour and anti-discrimination laws. Nam, a South Korean citizen and U.S. permanent resident, was employed by the Mission as a chauffeur. His duties included driving high-level officials, adhering to diplomatic protocols, and maintaining confidentiality of classified information. Nam was required to undergo a high-level security clearance and sign annual confidentiality agreements. He was eventually terminated at age 61, after his contract was extended due to his wife's job loss during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that Nam's employment fell within the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court later granted Nam's motion for partial summary judgment, awarding him damages and interest on his wage-and-hour claims, while the remaining claims were set for trial. The Mission appealed, arguing that it was immune under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Nam without resolving factual disputes regarding the nature of his employment. The court emphasized that the district court should have considered whether Nam's employment was governmental or commercial in nature, taking into account the context of his duties and the security measures involved. The appellate court instructed the district court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and, if necessary, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity exception. View "Nam v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United" on Justia Law

The case involves the Restaurant Law Center and the Texas Restaurant Association challenging a final rule by the Department of Labor (DOL) that restricts when employers can claim a "tip credit" for "tipped employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The tip credit allows employers to pay tipped employees a lower hourly wage, assuming tips will make up the difference to meet the minimum wage. The DOL's final rule imposes limits on the amount of non-tip-producing work a tipped employee can perform while still allowing the employer to claim the tip credit.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, stating they would not suffer irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that the plaintiffs had shown irreparable harm and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court evaluated the merits and granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL, holding that the final rule was a permissible interpretation of the FLSA under Chevron deference and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the final rule was contrary to the clear statutory text of the FLSA and was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the FLSA's definition of a "tipped employee" does not support the DOL's restrictions on non-tip-producing work. The court concluded that the final rule improperly focused on the pursuit of tips rather than the duties of the occupation itself. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the DOL, rendered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and vacated the final rule. View "Restaurant Law Center v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The petitioner worked part-time as a bus fueler and washer at Marble Valley Regional Transit (MVRT) for approximately four years. He passed a preemployment drug screen and signed an acknowledgment of MVRT’s drug and alcohol policy, which included random drug testing and termination for a positive drug test. In December 2022, he tested positive for marijuana during a random drug test and was terminated in January 2023 for violating U.S. Department of Transportation and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations. The petitioner had a medical marijuana card issued in early 2020.The petitioner applied for unemployment benefits, which were denied by a claims adjudicator on the grounds of misconduct. He appealed to an administrative law judge (ALJ), who affirmed the denial but reduced the disqualification period to six weeks, recognizing the medical use of cannabis. The petitioner then filed a document with the Employment Security Board, seeking a declaratory ruling on the applicability of the misconduct disqualification provision to off-duty medical cannabis use. The Board treated this as an appeal and affirmed the ALJ’s decision, stating that the petitioner’s actions constituted misconduct under MVRT’s drug policy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court held that the Board properly declined to issue a declaratory ruling because the petitioner had an available remedy through a direct appeal. The Court emphasized that declaratory rulings are not a substitute for timely appeals of agency decisions. The petitioner’s appeal of the Board’s decision was dismissed as untimely, and the Court affirmed the Board’s order declining to issue a declaratory ruling. View "Skoric v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law