Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Reginald Brown, who was serving as interim police chief in Monroe, Louisiana, was dismissed from the Monroe Police Department following his handling of an excessive force complaint against officers. The incident involved a body camera recording showing an officer kicking a suspect, Timothy Williams, during an arrest. Brown was informed of the complaint and took immediate steps, including placing officers on administrative leave and notifying city officials. However, questions arose regarding the timing of Brown’s decision to request the Louisiana State Police to conduct the criminal investigation, particularly whether the delay was influenced by an upcoming mayoral election. Subsequent internal reviews included an interrogation and a polygraph examination, which Brown was found to have failed, leading to allegations of dishonesty and improper delay for personal benefit.Brown appealed his termination to the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, which, after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, found cause for discipline but determined that termination was excessive. The board reduced the penalty to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The City of Monroe appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court, which reinstated Brown’s termination, finding his conduct egregious and the board’s reduction arbitrary. Brown then appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, which reversed the district court and reinstated the board’s ninety-day suspension, holding that the district court lacked authority to modify the board’s disciplinary decision once it found the board acted in good faith for cause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. The court clarified that judicial review of the board’s disciplinary decisions is limited to determining whether the board acted in good faith for cause, and courts may not modify the board’s chosen discipline if that standard is met. The Supreme Court held that the board’s decision to reduce Brown’s discipline was reasonably supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "MONROE MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD VS. BROWN" on Justia Law

In 2023, the Maine Legislature enacted the Paid Family and Medical Leave (PFML) program, requiring employers to remit quarterly premiums into a state fund beginning January 1, 2025. The program allows covered individuals to take up to twelve weeks of leave for qualifying reasons, with benefits paid from the fund. Employers may apply to substitute an approved private plan that provides substantially equivalent benefits, which exempts them from further premium payments. The Maine Department of Labor adopted rules implementing the PFML program, including a provision that all employers must pay nonrefundable premiums for the first quarter of 2025, even if they later obtain approval for a private plan. Employers could begin applying for private plan approval after April 1, 2025, due to the time needed for insurers to develop compliant policies.The Maine State Chamber of Commerce and Bath Iron Works challenged the Department’s rule requiring nonrefundable premiums, arguing it conflicted with the PFML Act and constituted an unconstitutional taking under both the Maine and U.S. Constitutions. The Kennebec County Superior Court accepted a consented-to motion to report three legal questions to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court: whether the rule conflicted with the Act or was arbitrary and capricious, and whether it constituted a taking under state or federal law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court accepted the report and held that the Department’s rules do not conflict with the PFML Act and are not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The Court found that the statute unambiguously requires employers to remit premiums until a private plan is approved, and the rules reasonably implement the legislative intent. Additionally, the Court determined that the obligation to pay premiums does not constitute a cognizable taking of private property under either the Maine or U.S. Constitution. The Court answered all three reported questions in the negative and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maine State Chamber of Commerce v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

A newspaper requested records from a school district related to an investigation into allegations that a long-time employee had sexually harassed other employees. The district hired a law firm to conduct a Title IX investigation, which resulted in a report. The district and the employee entered into a settlement agreement ending his employment, with the district paying him a lump sum and a portion of his health insurance. The newspaper sought all documents related to the investigation and settlement, but the district repeatedly denied the requests, citing statutory exemptions for confidential and personnel records.The Superior Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case after the newspaper filed suit. The court granted the district’s request for in camera review of the records, conducted the review without counsel present, and ordered redacted records to be distributed. It found that some records were protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine and exempt under RSA 91-A:5, XII. The court also found that the remaining records, including the settlement agreement, were exempt as confidential or personnel files under RSA 91-A:5, IV. The court denied the newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, concluding the district had satisfied its obligations regarding records of payments to the employee.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that in camera review without counsel present is permissible when disclosure may cause an invasion of privacy. It affirmed that records protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine are exempt from disclosure without a balancing test. However, it found the lower court erred in applying the exemption for confidential and personnel files, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns if identifying information was redacted. The court also held that the district must disclose unaltered records of payments made to the employee and awarded attorney’s fees and costs for that violation. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Keene Publ'g Corp. v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Sandra Gardner, a member of the International Association of Machinists, sought to bring a lawsuit against her union and several of its officers, alleging that the General Secretary-Treasurer, Dora Cervantes, had misused union funds for personal travel, thereby breaching her fiduciary duty under federal law. Before filing suit, Gardner and other union members sent multiple letters to the union’s leadership demanding an accounting of the allegedly misappropriated funds and requesting that the union itself bring legal action against the implicated officers. The union responded by commissioning an independent accounting firm to investigate the claims, which ultimately found no evidence of wrongdoing. The union’s Executive Council, relying on this report, declined to take further action.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed Gardner’s verified application for leave to file suit under 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). The district court denied her application, concluding that Gardner had not satisfied the statutory “demand requirement” because the union had responded to her request by conducting an accounting and found no basis for further action. The court did not address whether Gardner had shown “good cause” to proceed with her claim, as required by the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Gardner had properly satisfied the demand requirement. The appellate court reasoned that Gardner’s letters clearly demanded both an accounting and that the union bring suit, and the union’s failure to initiate legal action meant the demand was not fully met. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Gardner’s application and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether Gardner has demonstrated good cause to proceed with her § 501 claim. View "Gardner v. International Association of Machinists" on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

The case involves an executive order issued by President Trump, which excluded over 40 federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements, citing national security concerns. The plaintiffs, six unions representing federal employees, argued that the executive order constituted First Amendment retaliation, was ultra vires, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process, abrogated contractual property rights, and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment.The Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against the executive order, focusing on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court found that the plaintiffs had raised serious questions about whether the order was retaliatory, citing statements from a White House Fact Sheet that criticized federal unions. The court concluded that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs, as the order threatened union operations and collective bargaining rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government's request for an emergency stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the government was likely to succeed on the merits of the retaliation claim. The court concluded that the executive order and the accompanying Fact Sheet demonstrated a focus on national security, and that the President would have issued the order regardless of the plaintiffs' protected conduct. The court also found that the government would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the injunction impeded the government's ability to manage national security-related functions. The court determined that the public interest favored granting the stay to preserve the President's authority in national security matters. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump" on Justia Law

Sun Valley Orchards, a New Jersey farm, was accused by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) of breaching an employment agreement under the H-2A nonimmigrant visa program. The DOL alleged that Sun Valley failed to provide adequate housing, meal plans, transportation, and guaranteed work hours to its workers, as stipulated in the job order. The DOL imposed civil penalties and back wages totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars through administrative proceedings.The case was first reviewed by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed most of the DOL's findings but slightly modified the penalties and back wages. Sun Valley then appealed to the Administrative Review Board, which upheld the ALJ's decision. Subsequently, Sun Valley challenged the DOL's decision in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing that the administrative proceedings violated Article III of the Constitution, among other claims. The District Court dismissed Sun Valley's claims, holding that the DOL's actions fit within the public-rights doctrine and that the agency had statutory authority to impose penalties and back wages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that Sun Valley was entitled to have its case decided by an Article III court. The court found that the DOL's enforcement action resembled a common law breach of contract suit, which traditionally would be heard in a court of law. The court also determined that the case did not fit within the public rights exception to Article III adjudication, as the H-2A labor certification regulations primarily concern domestic employment law rather than immigration control. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Sun Valley. View "Sun Valley Orchards LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Employees of Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc. filed a lawsuit in Massachusetts state court, claiming they were entitled to prevailing wages under the Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) for work performed. They argued that their work fell within the scope of the PWA. Veolia removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Veolia. The court concluded that the Special Act of 1997, which pertains to the Springfield Water and Sewer Commission, exempted Veolia from the obligation to pay prevailing wages under the PWA. The employees appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The central issue was whether the Special Act required Veolia to pay prevailing wages. The court noted that the outcome depended on unresolved questions of Massachusetts law and significant policy concerns. Consequently, the First Circuit decided to certify the dispositive state law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for clarification.The First Circuit certified two questions: the meaning of "construction and design of improvements" in the Special Act and whether the Special Act is incompatible with the PWA under the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction over the appeal pending the resolution of these certified questions. View "Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Katrina Robertson, an independent contractor working as a polygraph examiner for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was involved in an automobile accident while exiting the DIA campus. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that a DIA employee's negligence caused the accident. The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it had not waived its sovereign immunity under the FTCA because a private employer in similar circumstances would be immune from suit under Virginia law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court found that the DIA was a "statutory employer" under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (VWCA) and that Robertson's injury occurred during the course of her work. Therefore, the VWCA provided the exclusive remedy, and the government was immune from the suit. The district court also denied Robertson's motion to certify a question to the Supreme Court of Virginia as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that under the FTCA, the United States is liable only to the extent that a private party would be liable in similar circumstances. Since a private employer in Virginia would be immune from a negligence suit under the VWCA if it were a statutory employer, the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Robertson v. United States" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Staci K. Shepherd, a Rhode Island State Police officer with a commendable 22-year career, suffered a heart attack during a firearms requalification program on May 2, 2017, which left her permanently disabled. She applied for a disability pension under Rhode Island law and the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Troopers Association. Superintendent Colonel James M. Manni denied her application, concluding that she failed to prove her heart attack was causally related to her employment. Shepherd then filed a declaratory-judgment complaint.The Superior Court found Superintendent Manni's decision arbitrary and capricious, declaring Shepherd entitled to a disability pension. The court criticized the superintendent's requirement for causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and his failure to consider the CBA's heart-attack presumption provision. The court granted Shepherd's motion for partial summary judgment, leading to the defendant's appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court noted that the superintendent applied an incorrect causation standard, requiring proof that the heart attack was caused by employment, rather than whether employment conditions contributed to the injury. The court emphasized that under the correct standard, it is sufficient if employment conditions contributed to the injury. Given the undisputed facts, including the stress and physical demands of Shepherd's job, the court concluded that her employment contributed to her heart attack. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, declaring Shepherd entitled to a disability pension. View "Shepherd v. Rhode Island State Police" on Justia Law