Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the district court and court of appeals that the workers' compensation commissioner erred in granting Employer's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Employee's review-reopening petition, holding that Employee was permitted to pursue a claim for a permanent injury in a review-reopening proceeding despite an earlier adjudication that her injury was not permanent.Employee was injured during the course and work of her employment. Employee filed a petition seeking workers' compensation for a permanent disability, but the deputy commissioner refused to order additional benefits beyond those that Employer had already paid. Employee filed a petition for review-reopening with the workers' compensation commission. The commission determined that Employee's claim for permanent disability benefits was barred by principles of res judicata. The district court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agency erred in dismissing Employer's review-reopening petition. View "Green v. North Central Iowa Regional Solid Waste Authority" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) and John Sandberg appealed a district court judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision on remand, entered after the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State by & through Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Sandberg (“Sandberg II”), 956 N.W.2d 342. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the ALJ had made conflicting and insufficient findings to support the finding that Sandberg’s claim was compensable and it was “unable to reconcile the ALJ’s decision with the statutory requirements for medical evidence supported by objective medical findings for a compensable injury in N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(10).” On remand, the ALJ made additional findings and again held Sandberg met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had sustained a compensable injury. WSI appealed to the district court and the court affirmed the ALJ’s order. On the second appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the “judgment affirming the ALJ’s revised order to the extent the order found Sandberg sustained a compensable injury; however, the Court remand[ed] the case to WSI for further proceedings on whether benefits must be awarded on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15.” On remand, WSI reversed its decision and accepted Sandberg’s claim on an aggravation basis and denied Sandberg disability benefits. Sandberg appealed to the district court, which affirmed WSI’s determination to award benefits on an aggravation basis and reversed the ALJ’s affirmance of WSI’s denial of disability benefits concluding WSI exceeded the scope of remand provided in Sandberg II. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding WSI exceeded the scope of the remand and in reversing the ALJ's order affirming WSI's denial of disability benefits. The Court affirmed the district court affirmance of the ALJ’s order awarding benefits on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15. The Court reinstated the ALJ’s order affirming WSI’s denial of disability benefits. View "Sandberg v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

Bird Rides, Inc. (Bird) launched its electric motorized scooter rental business in the City of Los Angeles (the City) by deploying hundreds of Bird scooters onto the City’s streets and sidewalks. Plaintiff and her daughter were on a City sidewalk just after twilight. The sidewalk was crowded with holiday shoppers, and Plaintiff did not see the back wheel of a Bird scooter sticking out from behind a trash can. She tripped on the scooter, fell, and sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs sued Bird and the City for negligence and other related claims. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, concluding neither Bird nor the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court’s judgment is correct as to the City, but the trial court erred when it dismissed the claims against Bird. Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the City are premised on the public entity’s discretionary authority to enforce the permit, the City is immune from liability under the Government Claims Act. In contrast, regardless of the permit’s terms, Bird may be held liable for breaching its general duty under section 1714 to use “ordinary care or skill in the management of [its] property.” The court explained that having deployed its dockless scooters onto public streets, Bird’s general duty encompasses an obligation, among other things, to use ordinary care to locate and move a Bird scooter when the scooter poses an unreasonable risk of danger to others. The court concluded that Plaintiff is authorized to assert a private action for public nuisance against the company. View "Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc." on Justia Law

On May 27, 2016, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Sgt. George Taylor, a police officer employed by the Chickasaw Police Department, discovered an automobile on the shoulder of the on-ramp to an interstate highway. Carlos Lens Fernandez ("Lens") was passed out inside the automobile, and the automobile's engine was running. After he failed to complete various field sobriety tests, Lens acknowledged that he was intoxicated. Sgt. Taylor arrested Lens for driving under the influence and, with assistance from Officer Gregory Musgrove, transported Lens to the Chickasaw City Jail. At the jail, Lens did not advise Sgt. Taylor or any other person that he had any medical issues or that he needed medical attention. According to both Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Phillip Burson, Lens appeared to be intoxicated, and nothing about their encounter with Lens indicated to them that Lens needed medical attention. At approximated 8 a.m., jailers checked on Lens, but he was not responding to oral commands. Officer Robert Wenzinger stated that when he checked Lens, he could not find a pulse and noticed that Lens was cool to the touch on his arm and neck. Emergency medical services were dispatched; by 8:50 a.m., attempts to resuscitate Lens were unsuccessful, and Lens was pronounced dead at 9:14 a.m. Lens's autopsy report listed the cause of death as "hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease." Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of Lens' estate, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in two separate actions in favor of the City of Chickasaw, and the varios officers and jail officials who checked on Lens when he was arrested and detained. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in either case, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Murey v. City of Chickasaw, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a now-retired Special Agent with the United States Secret Service, filed a civil suit against two United States Park Police officers (“officers”) under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff asserted that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully seizing him during two traffic stops. A jury found the officers liable for Plaintiff’s emotional injuries resulting from the constitutional violations and awarded him a total of $205,000 in compensatory damages and $525,000 in punitive damages. The district court entered final judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and later denied the officers’ post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff presented a cognizable Bivens claim because his claim is not meaningfully different from the claim asserted in Bivens. Both cases involved allegations of unjustified, warrantless seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment committed by federal “line” officers conducting routine police work. Also, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. They violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by significantly prolonging the initial stop without justification and by initiating a second, unjustified stop. This constitutional right to be free from such unlawful seizures was clearly established at the time the seizures occurred. Further, the court held that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of emotional injury to support the compensatory damage award, and the punitive damages award was not excessive. View "Nathaniel Hicks v. Gerald Ferreyra" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service, together with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, managed the rapidly changing fire conditions and actively communicated with the public about the Lolo Peak Fire. After the fire, various affected landowners sued the federal government. They claim that the Forest Service is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for failing to comply with its duty to consult with them about fire-suppression activities on and near their properties. Specifically, they argued that the Forest Service was required to consult with landowners through individualized—rather than public—communication channels. The district court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the property owners’ claims were barred by the discretionary function exception.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel applied the requisite two-step test to determine whether the discretionary function exception applied. First, the panel examined whether there was a federal statute, regulation, or policy that prescribed the Forest Service’s course of action regarding the agency’s communications with the landowners during the Lolo Peak fire in the Bitterroot Mountains in Montana in July 2017. The panel held that the Forest Service’s specific communications with the landowners exceeded the incident decision’s instruction and involved an element of judgment or choice sufficient to satisfy the first step of the discretionary function exception. The panel held that the Forest Service’s decisions about notifying the landowners about fire-suppression activities likely to occur on and near their properties were susceptible to a policy analysis. View "MICHELLE SCHURG, ET AL V. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of Defendant City of Los Angeles (the City), in a lawsuit alleging the City knowingly failed to remedy a dangerous condition on public property adjacent to Plaintiff’s place of work, as a result of which Plaintiff contracted typhus. The trial court entered this judgment after sustaining a demurrer on the basis that, under Government Code section 855.4, the City was immune from liability.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling finding that the City’s demurrer did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The court explained that Plaintiff has not proffered any facts she could allege, based on which her complaint would no longer describe injury “resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or controlling the communication of disease within the community” that was “the result of the exercise of discretion vested in the public entity or the public employee.” Rather, her arguments that no exercise of discretion occurred are grounded in a definition of “exercise of discretion,” which the court concluded is inapplicable here. Further, the court reasoned that because it concluded that the SAC sufficiently alleges immunity under section 855.4, subdivision (a), additional allegations Plaintiff represents she could add establishing that the City acted without due care as required by section 855.4, subdivision (b) would not defeat such immunity. View "Greenwood v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, plaintiffs M.D. Doe, A.J. Doe, and S. Doe (together, plaintiffs) sued defendant Marysville Joint Unified School District (the District) and at least one District employee, alleging their school counselor sexually abused them. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the District after finding that plaintiffs failed to timely file a government claim before filing their complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for victims bringing childhood claims of sexual assault. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action against the District and certain individuals predicated on the same set of facts as their 2002 suit. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer without leave to amend as to plaintiffs, finding that the prior dismissal was res judicata, and that allowing section 340.1 to reopen a final judgment would run afoul of constitutional separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred because their prior claims were not “litigated to finality” within the meaning of section 340.1 and could therefore be revived, and because dismissing plaintiffs’ claims violated equal protection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming an administrative law judge's finding that Claimant's total knee replacement was compensable, holding that Claimant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Claimant injured his knee while at work and received workers' compensation benefits. Claimant continued to experience knee pain after surgery and ultimately underwent a total knee replacement. Employer filed a medical fee dispute, and an ALJ found that the total knee replacement was compensable. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to conclude that Claimant's total knee replacement was reasonable and necessary and was within his discretion to make inferences. View "Perry County Bd. of Education v. Campbell" on Justia Law