Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In September 2018, Bryana Baker was arrested and taken to Butler County Jail, where she began experiencing drug withdrawal symptoms. After attempting to escape, she was placed in disciplinary isolation. Despite multiple mental health assessments indicating she was not suicidal, Baker was placed on suicide watch due to erratic behavior. On September 24, she was removed from suicide watch but was not cleared for single-celling. The next day, after a series of altercations with her cellmate, Officer April Riahi closed Baker’s cell door. Shortly thereafter, Baker was found hanging in her cell and later died.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants, including Officer Riahi, Sheriff Richard Jones, and Butler County. The court found no evidence of deliberate indifference or constitutional violations by the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Officer Riahi was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law indicated her actions were unconstitutional. The court also found that Sheriff Jones could not be held liable under supervisory liability since there was no underlying constitutional violation by Riahi. Additionally, the court ruled that Butler County was not liable under municipal liability theories because there was no deliberate indifference to a clearly established right. Lastly, the court determined that Riahi and Jones were entitled to Ohio statutory immunity on the state-law claims, as their actions did not amount to recklessness under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, granting summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. View "Campbell v. Riahi" on Justia Law

A retired Navy chaplain, Allen Lancaster, sued several Navy officials in their official capacities, alleging discrimination in the Navy’s promotion practices. Lancaster claimed he was not promoted due to retaliation based on personal hostility and denominational prejudice. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including orders to remedy the harm to his career and to hold new promotion boards. Lancaster also challenged the six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States and the constitutionality of a statutory privilege for selection board proceedings.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Lancaster’s amended complaint with prejudice on res judicata grounds, referring to several prior decisions in the longstanding dispute over the Navy’s promotion procedures for chaplains. After Lancaster’s death, his widow, Darlene Lancaster, sought to reopen the case, substitute herself as the plaintiff, and amend the dismissed complaint. The district court denied these requests, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Lancaster’s death mooted his claims for prospective relief, as he could no longer benefit from the requested declarations and orders. The court also found that any potential claims for retrospective relief were barred by sovereign immunity, as the Lancasters failed to demonstrate an unequivocal waiver of this immunity. Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the case on res judicata grounds or to rule on the widow’s post-dismissal motion. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Lancaster v. Secretary of the Navy" on Justia Law

Aly Abdellatif, an Egyptian citizen, suspected he was placed on government watchlists after experiencing unwarranted airport security screenings. He sought correction through the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) redress program, which responded without confirming or denying his watchlist status. Abdellatif and his wife, Nina Araujo, petitioned for review, challenging the administration of the traveler redress program and their treatment during travel.The petitioners initially filed their case in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They named multiple federal agencies and officials as respondents, alleging that Abdellatif's inclusion on the Selectee List and TSA watchlists led to enhanced security screenings and secondary inspections. They argued that TSA's redress process failed to correct erroneous information, violating statutory obligations and due process rights. The court dismissed the petition against all respondents except TSA, citing jurisdictional limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition in part for lack of standing, as TSA cannot remove names from the Selectee List, which is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The court found that petitioners' injuries related to the Selectee List were not redressable in this lawsuit. However, the court denied the remaining claims on the merits, concluding that TSA's redress process complies with statutory requirements and does not violate due process. The court also rejected the Fourth Amendment claims, finding that the enhanced security screenings and secondary inspections described were reasonable and did not constitute unreasonable searches or seizures. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Abdellatif v. DHS" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hunt arrived at the Lee County Courthouse to testify in a criminal case. Directed outside due to courtroom scheduling, Hunt re-entered and sat on a staircase. Officer Dale Acosta confronted Hunt, leading to a heated exchange. Despite Hunt's explanation of his courthouse business, Acosta arrested him for obstruction, claiming Hunt disrupted the county tax office.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed most of Hunt's claims but allowed his Fourth Amendment claim against Acosta, a failure to train or supervise claim against Mayor Jimmy Williams and Chief of Police Martin Wilson, and a Monell claim against the City of Marianna. The court denied qualified and quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta and qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson. Acosta, Williams, and Wilson appealed the denial of immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta's initial stop of Hunt, as Acosta acted under a judge's directive. However, the court affirmed the denial of quasi-judicial and qualified immunity for Acosta's arrest of Hunt, finding no probable cause for obstruction. The court also reversed the denial of qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson, ruling that Hunt failed to show a pattern of unconstitutional acts by Acosta that would have put them on notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Hunt v. Acosta" on Justia Law

T.W., a Harvard Law School graduate with disabilities, sued the New York State Board of Law Examiners for denying her requested accommodations on the New York State bar exam in 2013 and 2014. She alleged violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. T.W. claimed that the Board's actions caused her to fail the bar exam twice, resulting in professional and financial harm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially denied the Board's motion to dismiss, finding that the Board had waived its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Board was immune from suit under Section 504. On remand, the district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss T.W.'s Title II claim, ruling that the Board was an "arm of the state" and entitled to sovereign immunity. The court also held that Title II did not abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity for money damages and that T.W. could not seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Board is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. It further concluded that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate sovereign immunity in the context of professional licensing. Additionally, the court found that the declaratory relief sought by T.W. was retrospective and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court also ruled that the injunctive relief sought by T.W. was not sufficiently tied to an ongoing violation of federal law, making it unavailable under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of T.W.'s claims for compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief. View "T.W. v. New York State Board of Law Examiners" on Justia Law

Vincent Bell, a pretrial detainee with an amputated right leg, alleged that deputies used excessive force during a cell extraction and transfer at the San Francisco Jail. Bell claimed that Sergeant Yvette Williams did not provide him with a wheelchair or other mobility device, forcing him to hop on one leg until he fell. Deputies then carried him by his arms and leg, causing him pain and minor injuries. Bell sued under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Bell on his excessive force claim against Williams and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the City and County of San Francisco. However, the jury did not find that Williams caused Bell physical or emotional harm. The jury awarded Bell $504,000 in compensatory damages against the City but not against Williams. The district court denied the defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the jury's verdict on Bell's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding substantial evidence supported these claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision on Bell's Monell theory of liability, concluding that Bell did not present substantial evidence showing that the City's training was the product of deliberate indifference to a known risk. The court also vacated the jury's compensatory damages award, deeming it grossly excessive, and remanded for a remittitur or a new trial on damages. View "BELL V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

In April 2012, Arnold Black was arrested during a traffic stop by East Cleveland police officers without any legitimate reason. Detective Randy Hicks violently assaulted Black and detained him in a storage room for four days. Black sued Hicks, Chief Ralph Spotts, and the City of East Cleveland for his injuries. In August 2019, a jury awarded Black $20 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages against Hicks and Spotts each. The trial court also awarded Black $5.2 million in prejudgment interest.The City of East Cleveland and Spotts appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over their discretionary appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied the city’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Despite these rulings, the city failed to satisfy the judgment or take steps to appropriate the necessary funds.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and granted Black’s request for a writ of mandamus. The court held that Black had a clear legal right to enforcement of the civil judgment and that the city had a legal duty to pay the judgment, including pre- and postjudgment interest. The court ordered the city to satisfy the judgment or take the necessary steps to appropriate the funds as described in R.C. 2744.06(A). The court rejected the city’s argument that a pending trial-court motion could reduce the amount owed, noting that Black had established the exact amount of money owed with sufficient evidence. View "State ex rel. Black v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation (Dobbin) held a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) to provide water service in certain areas of Texas. Dobbin, a recipient of federal loans under 7 U.S.C. § 1926, which grants monopoly protection to loan recipients, faced decertification petitions from developers SIG Magnolia L.P. and Redbird Development L.L.C. The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) granted these petitions, finding that Dobbin was not providing actual water service to the developers' properties. Dobbin then filed a lawsuit in federal court, arguing that the Texas Water Code section allowing decertification was preempted by federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed Dobbin's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the PUC officials, concluding they were not appropriate defendants under § 1983. At the summary judgment stage, the district court dismissed Dobbin's remaining claims with prejudice, primarily on jurisdictional grounds. The court found that Dobbin lacked a cause of action against the developers and that an injunction against the PUC would not redress Dobbin's injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dobbin lacked standing to seek an injunction against the PUC officials because such relief would not redress its injuries. The court also upheld the dismissal of Dobbin's § 1983 claim against the PUC officials, reiterating that state officials in their official capacities are not "persons" under § 1983. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss Dobbin's claims against the developers with prejudice, as Dobbin lacked a viable cause of action against them. View "Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation v. Lake" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Cassandra Socha, a patrol officer with the Joliet Police Department (JPD), sent a text message to her neighbor criticizing her for testifying in the criminal trial of Socha’s boyfriend. A prosecutor recommended that Sergeant Edward Grizzle secure a search warrant for Socha’s cell phone, which he did, obtaining authority to search for any and all data related to electronic communications. Socha turned over her phone, expressing concerns about personal content. JPD detectives used forensic software to extract all data from her phone. Rumors later surfaced that explicit content from her phone had been seen by JPD members, with two detectives admitting to viewing such content.Socha sued the City of Joliet, Sgt. Grizzle, and others, bringing multiple claims under federal and Illinois law. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to Sgt. Grizzle on the § 1983 claim, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also granted summary judgment to the City on the intrusion upon seclusion claim, rather than relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over the Illinois law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that Sgt. Grizzle was entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the summary judgment on the § 1983 claim. However, the court disagreed with the district court on the intrusion upon seclusion claim, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that Detective McKinney accessed Socha’s photograph intentionally and without authorization. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on that claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also noted that the district court should decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim on remand. View "Socha v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law