Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court to deny Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) challenging the failure of the Reno Police Department (RPD) to disclose certain records, holding that the district court erred in part.At issue on appeal was RPD's refusal to disclose an investigative report to Appellant, who owned and operated an online news website, and RPD's redaction to officers' faces before disclosing body-worn camera footage. The district court denied Appellant's mandamus petition as to both issues. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part regarding the investigative report, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's petition with respect to the report without individualized findings regarding the redacted material; and (2) affirmed the district court's decision regarding the redactions to the body-worn camera footage, holding that the district court correctly denied this portion of the petition. View "Conrad v. Reno Police Dep't" on Justia Law

In January 2023, Assembly Bill 1936 changed the name of the former “Hastings College of the Law” to “College of the Law, San Francisco.” The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of AB 1936. The College’s Dean and Directors in their official capacities (College Defendants) filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.162), arguing that the complaint was replete with references to their public statements and resolutions regarding a new name and calling upon the Legislature to pass legislation adopting it. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the causes of action were based on the Legislature’s enactment of AB 1936, not on the speech or petitioning activity that preceded it.On appeal, the College Defendants argued that the anti-SLAPP statute applied because AB 1936 “authorizes and requires” them to engage in particular speech—the new name by which they “represent the College’s identity and values to the public”—and because the claims, if successful, would prevent or interfere with that speech. The court of appeal upheld the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. Even assuming that future speech in which the College Defendants use the new name is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, it is not the reason the plaintiffs have sued them. The plaintiffs’ claims are not based on the College Defendants’ speech. View "Hastings College Conservation Committee v. Faigman" on Justia Law

Chapman filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1) request, seeking information pertaining to the Citation Administration and Adjudication System (CANVAS) for the enforcement of parking, red-light, and speed-camera tickets. The Chicago Department of Finance denied the request, citing section 7(1)(o), which exempts: “Administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing operations, including but not limited to software, operating protocols, computer program abstracts, file layouts, source listings, object modules, load modules, user guides, documentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of computerized systems, employee manuals, and any other information that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the system or its data or the security of materials exempt under this Section.” The First District affirmed an order requiring the production of the documents.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The requested records are file layouts under section 7(1)(o); a reasonable, commonsense interpretation of section 7(1)(o) indicates that file layouts are exempt from disclosure. While public records are presumed to be open and accessible, the legislature has specifically provided for a narrow exemption with respect to administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing operations. Section 7(1)(o)'s exemption is focused on the security of the government body’s data system, and requiring a hearing to determine whether disclosure would jeopardize the security of that system every time a file layout is requested would weaken the specific exemption. View "Chapman v. Chicago Department of Finance" on Justia Law

The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were enacted to provide all Americans with universal access to telecommunications services. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implemented that mandate by establishing the Universal Service Fund, which now comprises four program mechanisms to “help[] compensate telephone companies or other communications entities for providing access to telecommunications services at reasonable and affordable rates throughout the country, including rural, insular and high costs areas, and to public institutions,” 47 U.S.C. 254. Certain telecommunications carriers must fund these efforts; on a quarterly basis, the FCC publishes the percentage of “interstate and international end-user telecommunications revenue” that covered telecommunications carriers must contribute to the Fund’s programs (the quarterly contribution factor). The Fund is administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC).A group of consumers, a nonprofit organization, and a carrier challenged this statutory arrangement as violating the nondelegation doctrine. They also alleged that the role of a private entity in administering the Fund violates the private-nondelegation doctrine. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Section 254 sufficiently guides the FCC’s discretion; Congress provided an intelligible principle and its delegation does not violate the separation of powers. USAC is subordinate to the FCC and performs ministerial and fact-gathering functions. View "Consumers' Research v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims of open records violations, holding that Iowa's Open Records Act, Iowa Code chapter 22, may permit Plaintiffs to pursue claims based on untimeliness and that the district court did not err in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss.In 2020 and 2021, Plaintiffs requested public records from Defendants. Plaintiffs brought this suit in December 2021, and in January 2022, Defendants provided responsive records. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the timeliness claims were moot. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) most of the claims concerning production of already-produced records were moot; and (2) with some qualifications, Plaintiffs could pursue claims that Defendants violated chapter 22 through delays in responding to Plaintiffs' open records requests. View "Belin v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Altice USA, Inc. (Altice) challenged N.J.A.C. 14:18-3.8, a regulation requiring cable companies to refund or not charge customers who cancel cable service before the end of a billing cycle for cable service after the date of cancellation. Altice argued that N.J.A.C. 14:18-38’s proration requirement effectively regulated its “rates for the provision of cable service” and was therefore expressly preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(1) of the federal Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). Assuming it was correct, Altice contended that once its customers sign up for a monthly plan, they had to pay for a full final month of cable service even if they terminate service before the month ends. Alternatively, Altice asserted that even if the consumer protection regulation is not preempted, the BPU expressly waived compliance with that requirement. The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (the BPU) and Division of Rate Counsel disagreed, contending this consumer protection regulation was a valid exercise of the State’s police power, which they argued the Cable Act explicitly authorized. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Section 543(a)(1) of the Cable Act did not preempt the proration requirement in N.J.A.C. 14:18-3.8. The Court found the regulation did not regulate “rates for the provision of cable service,” but rather prevents cable companies from charging for cable service that customers have cancelled. The regulation does not set the “rate” that companies can charge. It simply protects cable users from paying for service they no longer want. The Appellate Division's judgment to the contrary was reversed and the The BPU's cease-and-desist order was reinstated. The matter was remanded for the appellate court to decide Altice's remaining argument that the BPU failed to follow proper procedures in this enforcement action. View "In the Matter of the Alleged Failure of Altice USA, Inc., to Comply with Certain Provisions of the New Jersey Cable Television Act and the New Jersey Administrative Code" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the denial of a records request made pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the petition.A reporter for Las Vegas Review-Journal, Inc. (LVRJ) made an NPRA request concerning an investigation into potential criminal activity by a law enforcement officer. After denying the request several times, the police department conducting the investigation, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) ultimately released heavily redacted portions of the investigative files. Metro sought relief, but the district court denied the petition on the grounds that the investigative files contained confidential and private information not subject to public release. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Metro failed to meet its burden to establish under the NPRA that the requested records were confidential in their entirety under either a statutory or caselaw exemption. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Congress enacted Sec. 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which established the Universal Service Fund (USF) and entrusted its administration to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC relies on a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (“USAC”), to aid it in its administration of the USF. USAC proposals are approved by the FCC either expressly or after fourteen days of agency inaction.USAC submitted its 2022 first quarter projections to the FCC on November 2, 2021. The FCC published these projections for notice andcomment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. On November 19, 2021, Petitioners submitted comments challenging the constitutionality of the USF and the FCC’s reliance on USAC. The FCC approved USAC’s proposal on December 27, 2021. In response, Petitioners filed this petition on January 5, 2022.On appeal, Petitioners assert that: (1) the Hobbs Act is not a jurisdictional bar to their constitutional claims; (2) Section 254 violates the nondelegation doctrine because Congress failed to supply the FCC with an intelligible principle; and (3) the FCC’s relationship with USAC violates the private nondelegation doctrine because the FCC does not adequately subordinate USAC in its administration of the USF.Finding that the Hobbs Act did not bar Petitioners' claims, the Fifth Circuit reached and rejected the claims on their merits. The Fifth Circuit held that Sec. 254 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine or the private non-delegation doctrine. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has long monitored local telephone companies’ “access stimulation.” In 2011, the FCC issued rules to address this phenomenon, defining when carriers engage in access stimulation and restricting the rates that they could charge. After local carriers found loopholes in this regulatory system, the FCC revisited and updated these rules, issuing the Updating the Intercarrier Compensation Regime to Eliminate Access Arbitrage (“Access Arbitrage Order”), 34 FCC Rcd. 9035 (2019). Wide Voice, LLC (“Wide Voice”), rearranged its business model and call traffic path in coordination with closely related entities, HD Carrier and Free Conferencing. Wide Voice petitions for review of the FCC’s order, specifically arguing that the FCC unreasonably concluded that it violated Section 201(b) by restructuring its business operations to continue imposing charges that were otherwise prohibited.   The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The panel held that the FCC properly exercised its authority under § 201(b) to hold Wide Voice liable for circumventing its newly adopted rule in the Access Arbitrage Order when the company devised a workaround. Contrary to Wide Voice’s assertions, the FCC need not establish new rules prohibiting the evasion of its existing rules to find a Section 201(b) violation. The panel rejected Wide Voice’s contention that it restructured its business to comply with, rather than evade, the FCC’s new rules. Finally, the panel rejected Wide Voice’s contention that even if the FCC was permitted to find its conduct “unjust and unreasonable,” it did not have fair notice that its practices were unlawful, and therefore the FCC violated its right to due process. View "WIDE VOICE, LLC V. FCC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court summarily denying the City of Greensboro's request that the trial court modify restrictions it imposed upon the possible use and discussion of certain police video records by the Greensboro City Council, holding that the trial court abused its discretion.The order at issue was entered pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 132-1.4A(g) to release recordings of an incident that occurred in Greensboro on September 10, 2016. The City of Greensboro interpreted the conditions in the order as a "gag order" and requested that the trial court modify the restrictions. The trial court summarily denied the request, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new hearing, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying, without explanation, the City's motion to modify the restrictions. View "In re Custodial Law Enforcement Recording" on Justia Law