Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court on consolidated Rule 80C appeals from the decision of the Maine Labor Relations Board (MLRB) on the School Administrative District 3 Education Association MEA/NEA’s (the Association) prohibited practice complaint, holding that the MLRB did not err when it held that the 120-day notice provision in Me. Rev. Stat. 26, 965(1) applied to the request for impact bargaining in this case.The Association filed a prohibited practice complaint with the MLRB against the Board of Directors of Regional School Unit 3 (the School Board), alleging that the School Board violated Me. Rev. Stat. 26, 964(1)(E) and 965(1) when it refused to participate in mediation and fact-finding procedures with respect to the effect of a new bus system. The MLRB determined that the Association failed to comply with the 120-day notice requirement in section 965(1) by failing to participate in fact-finding concerning the impact of the new busing system. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the MLRB did not clearly err in finding that the Association did not provide adequate notice to satisfy section 965(1). View "SAD 3 Education Ass’n v. RSU 3 Board of Directors" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review of the Secretary's order requiring Georgia to repay approximately $2.1 million of federal grant funds to the United States Department of Education. The court held that the Secretary properly considered the circumstances of the underlying fraud in petitioner's case in denying the equitable offset remedy, which he noted was to be determined based on agency precedent on a case by case basis at the discretion of the trier of fact. In this case, the nature and scope of the violation was too serious to warrant an equitable offset given petitioner's employees participated in a complex fraud scheme which led to the state improperly awarding $5.7 million to seventeen subgrantees who did not qualify to receive those funds. View "Georgia Department of Education v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review of the Secretary's order requiring Georgia to repay approximately $2.1 million of federal grant funds to the United States Department of Education. The court held that the Secretary properly considered the circumstances of the underlying fraud in petitioner's case in denying the equitable offset remedy, which he noted was to be determined based on agency precedent on a case by case basis at the discretion of the trier of fact. In this case, the nature and scope of the violation was too serious to warrant an equitable offset given petitioner's employees participated in a complex fraud scheme which led to the state improperly awarding $5.7 million to seventeen subgrantees who did not qualify to receive those funds. View "Georgia Department of Education v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the New Mexico Public Education Department could take into consideration federal impact aid payments a school district receives, or is anticipated to receive, in the Department’s allocation of state equalization guarantee (SEG) distribution payments to the district during the fiscal year. The Court determined the Department could not reduce SEG distribution payments to a district based on anticipated impact aid payments or payments actually received until the State has received certification from the Secretary of the United States Department of Education (DOE Secretary) or the State has obtained permission from the DOE Secretary to consider impact aid prior to certification. Once the State has received its certification from the DOE Secretary, the certification shall apply retroactively to any impact aid payments received by the district during the entire fiscal year. View "N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't v. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. #89" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the mandate relief sought by Today's Fresh Start. Today's Fresh Start sought both an approval and renewal of its charter in the same petition to the school district. The court held that a petition for renewal is governed by different procedures than a petition seeking to add an additional location, and that IUSD was correct in treating them separately. The court agreed with the school district and the trial court that the deemed approval applied to the petition to renew the charter, but not to the request for a material revision to add a specified location. In this case, the school district retained the authority to consider the request for material revision to add the specified location despite the fact that the renewal petition had been deemed approved. View "Today's Fresh Start Charter School v. Inglewood Unified School District" on Justia Law

School Boards sued, alleging that Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B)) and Education Code 42238.24 and 56523(f) “implemented . . . broad changes in mandate law that were intended to eliminate or reduce the State’s mandate reimbursement obligations” and shifted the cost of the Behavioral Intervention Plans Mandate ($65 million annually) and the Graduation Requirements mandate ($250 million annually), to districts and county offices of education. Plaintiffs claimed violation of California Constitution article XIII B, section 6 or article III, section 3; that Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B) “impermissibly burdens the constitutional right to reimbursement guaranteed by article XIII B, section 6 and is invalid to the extent it allows the State to reduce or eliminate mandate claims by claiming ‘offsetting revenues’ that do not represent new or additional funding . . . as reflected in the Legislature’s directives in Education Code sections [42238.24] and 56523.” The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of the claims, in part. Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B), as applied in Education Code 42238.24 and 56523(f), does not violate the state’s constitutional obligation to reimburse local governments for the costs of mandated programs and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. It is constitutional for the legislature to designate funding it already provides as offsetting revenue when reimbursing them for new state-mandated programs where the legislation operates prospectively only. View "California School Boards Association v. State of California" on Justia Law

Twenty-one public school districts claimed the Mississippi Legislature’s appropriations for public education during fiscal years 2010-2015 were statutorily inadequate. The districts contended Mississippi Code Section 37-151-6 mandated the Legislature fully fund the Mississippi Adequate Education Program (MAEP), but the Legislature failed to follow this mandate. They sought judicial enforcement of this statute in Hinds County Chancery Court, requesting more than $235 million in State funds - the difference between what they received and what they claim they should have received had the Legislature fully funded MAEP. The chancellor found the school districts were not entitled to relief because he determined that Section 37-151-6 was not a binding mandate. The chancellor, therefore, ​dismissed the school districts’ claim. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found that Section 37-151-6 was not mandatory, it affirmed. View "Clarksdale Municipal School District et al. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Anthony Burke was a child diagnosed with an autism-spectrum disorder. Throughout the first six months of 2010, Anthony and his family were covered by a group health insurance policy (the “Policy”) with Appellant, Independence Blue Cross (“Insurer”), maintained through Anthony’s father, John Burke’s employer. Initially, Anthony received “applied behavioral analysis” (ABA) treatment at home. In August 2009, before an Autism Coverage Law became effective relative to the Burkes’ coverage, the family requested benefits, under the Policy, for ABA services to be provided at the parochial elementary school attended by Anthony. Insurer denied coverage on account of an express place-of-services exclusion in the Policy delineating that services would not be covered if the care was provided in certain locations, including schools. In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Mr. Burke argued that the place-of-services exclusion in the Policy was nullified, as it pertained to in-school services, by the Autism Coverage Law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Pennsylvania Legislature intended to permit only general exclusions that would not substantially undermine the mandatory coverage requirement: “we simply do not believe that the Legislature intended to permit insurers to exclude coverage in the sensory-laden educational environment where children spend large portions of their days, or to require families to litigate the issue of medical necessity discretely in individual cases to secure such location-specific coverage for the treatment.” The Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of the Burkes, and that the Policy’s place-of-services exclusion was ineffective under the Autism Recovery Law. View "Burke v. Independence Blue Cross" on Justia Law

In this appeal, intervening statutory law enacted by the General Assembly rendered moot the legal issues decided by the circuit court.Here, the circuit court sustained the Attorney General’s challenge to Governor Matthew Bevin’s authority under Ky. Rev. Stat. 12.028 to abolish and reorganize the University of Louisville Board of Trustees and permanently enjoined the Governor from implementing executive orders issued in connection with his effort. The Supreme Court dismissed the Governor’s appeal and remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, holding that newly enacted Senate Bill 107 controls over section 12.028. The case is moot because Senate Bill 107 provides a specific statutory path for a governor to disband and reconstitute a university’s governing board and creates a process for the removal of individual members of a university’s governing board. View "Bevin v. Beshear" on Justia Law

This case involved the expulsion of then-high school student S.G. by the Henry County Board of Education (“Local Board”) as discipline for fighting on school grounds in violation of the student handbook. Specifically, she was charged with physically abusing others, and with a violation that constituted a misdemeanor under Georgia law. Following an evidentiary hearing before a disciplinary hearing officer, S.G. was expelled from Locust Grove High School, and that decision was affirmed by the Local Board. S.G. then filed an appeal to the Superior Court. After considering the evidentiary record, briefs submitted by the parties, and oral argument, the superior court reversed the State Board’s decision and ordered the Local Board to remove the disciplinary findings from the student’s record and to amend the record to reflect the student’s innocence of the disciplinary charges brought against her. That prompted the Local Board’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the superior court’s reversal of the Local Board’s ruling. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the Local Board’s petition for writ of certiorari to examine two issues: whether the Court of Appeals opinion imposed an improper burden of proof upon local school boards with respect to a student’s self-defense claim to disciplinary charges for engaging in a fight; and whether, regardless of its burden of proof analysis, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Local Board improperly rejected S.G.’s self-defense claim. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for “veering off courts in substituting its own findings of fact instead of remanding the case to the Local Board to apply the proper law to the record evidence and reach its own findings.” View "Henry Cty. Bd. of Education v. S.G." on Justia Law