Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Attorney General for the State of Louisiana brought an action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies alleging, among other things, violations of the Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs Integrity Law (MAPIL). The district court entered a judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of the Attorney General, finding the defendants' alleged misconduct in marketing certain drugs had violated provisions of MAPIL as it read in November 2003, and awarding civil penalties of $257,679,500.00, $70,000,000.00 in attorney fees, and $3,000,200.00 in costs. The court of appeal affirmed the district court's judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court found the Attorney General failed to establish sufficient facts to prove a cause of action against the defendants under MAPIL because no evidence was presented that any defendant made or attempted to make a fraudulent claim for payment against any Louisiana medical assistance program within the scope of MAPIL. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "Caldwell v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Micah Smith was charged with unauthorized participation in a medical assistance program. The State maintained Smith was excluded from participating in medical assistance programs through the administrative process by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) for various allegations of fraud and misconduct. After that exclusion, Smith continued to serve as the billing agent for Medicaid providers, despite his exclusion. Smith filed a motion to quash in which he challenged La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(4) as overbroad because it "prohibit[ed] a substantial amount of free speech and actions which would be protected under the First Amendment." He filed a second motion to quash, challenging La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) as "so sweeping in its proscription that it denie[d] a wide range of protected benefits to which a majority of Americans are entitled." The district court denied Smith's first motion by granted the second. The State appealed. After review of the district court record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's declaration that La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) was unconstitutional, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Smith" on Justia Law

Louisiana Machinery Company, L.L.C. and Louisiana Machinery Rentals, L.L.C., Louisiana's exclusive Caterpillar franchise dealers, sold, leased, and/or repaired Caterpillar equipment and machinery in parishes throughout the state. Following an audit, the taxing authorities from numerous parishes began tax collection proceedings against the companies, alleging they incorrectly failed to charge and collect sales and use taxes from their customers on their taxable sales, leases, and/or repairs for certain tax periods, and that the companies were liable for these taxes, penalties, and interest under the provisions of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (ULSTC). The tax collector for Catahoula Parish obtained partial summary judgments at district court, declaring that the tax assessments it issued to the companies were final, and the executory judgments issued by the court and could not be challenged. The companies appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed the grants of partial summary judgment based on deficiency of the notices of assessment and the lack of sufficient evidence to support the judgments. The tax collector applied for supervisory review to the State Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the court of appeal properly reversed the district court's grants of partial summary judgment, and remanded the cases back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Catahoula Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are producers of rice in Louisiana. In 1972, the Legislature enacted La. R.S. 3:3531, et seq. and La. R.S. 3:3541, et seq. which established the Louisiana Rice Promotion Board and the Louisiana Rice Research Board ("the Rice Boards"), to promote the growth and development of the rice industry in Louisiana. The Rice Statutes were amended in 1992 to provide that a refund is not available if the voting majority of rice producers vote to abolish the statutory refund provisions. Since the Rice Statutes went into effect, rice producers voting in the periodic referendums have approved the levy of an assessment. The refund provisions were abolished in the 1992 referendum. Plaintiffs, approximately forty rice producers, filed suit against the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry (LDAF) and the Rice Boards, challenging the constitutionality of the Rice Statutes both on their face and as applied, as an improper delegation of legislative authority. Plaintiffs argued the Rice Statutes permit a small group of private citizens to determine by majority vote whether the LDAF shall enforce and collect statutory assessments on rice, and whether the refund provisions will be abolished. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, declaring those sections of the Rice Statutes relative to abolishment of the refunds unconstitutional. The LDAF, State and the Rice Boards directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded La. R.S. 3:3534 and La. R.S. 3:3544 were facially unconstitutional. The Legislature improperly transferred its assessment power to a particular group of private voters who could impose, maintain or revoke the assessment and right to refunds through private elections. Thus, the Court affirmed and amended the district court's judgment to declare La. R.S. 3:3534 and La. R4. S. 3:354 unconstitutional in their entirety. View "Krielow v. Louisiana Dept. of Agriculture & Forestry" on Justia Law

In 2005, Patrick Richard sustained a work-related injury at the State Department of Transportation and Development ("DOTD"). After Mr. Richard's injury, DOTD began paying him workers' compensation benefits. Mr. Richard took disability retirement in 2007. Upon retiring, Mr. Richard spoke with a DOTD employee about the effect his receipt of workers' compensation benefits would have on his disability retirement benefits. Thereafter, Mr. Richard began simultaneously receiving disability retirement benefits through the Louisiana State Employees Retirement System ("LASERs"), and workers' compensation benefits through DOTD. In August 2007, DOTD informed Mr. Richard it had been overpaying him for workers' compensation benefits. In early 2011, DOTD filed a disputed claim for compensation, seeking an offset. In response, Mr. Richard filed an exception of prescription, arguing DOTD's claim for reimbursement was subject to a three-year prescriptive period. The matter proceeded to a trial before the Office of Workers' Compensation ("OWC"). The OWC denied Mr. Richard's exception of prescription. The OWC further held DOTD is entitled to an offset of $224.05 per week as of April 21, 2007, until Mr. Richard converted to regular retirement benefits at age 60. Mr. Richard appealed. The court of appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court of appeal affirmed the OWC's denial of Mr. Richard's exception of prescription. However, the court found the OWC erred in holding DOTD was entitled to an offset of workers' compensation benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court of appeal incorrectly applied the law. Accordingly, the Court reinstated the OWC's judgment granting the employer an offset. View "Louisiana v. Richard" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical distributor/repackager sought review of an appellate court decision that reversed a decision of the Louisiana Office of Workers' Compensation Administration. The Office awarded certain unpaid invoices for physician-dispensed medications (subject to a statutory limit) in favor of the distributor/repackager. The appellate court reversed based on a finding that the distributor/repackager did not have a right of action. After considering the applicable law, the Supreme Court found the anti-assignment language of La. R.S. 23:1205(A) did not prohibit the assignment of a health care provider's claims to a third party, an express contractual novation was effective, and an agent could statutorily be considered a health care provider based on the definition contained in La. R.S. 23:1021(6). Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Rebel Distributors Corp., Inc. v. Luba Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

During the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the House of Representatives considered House Bill No. 61, which provided for the establishment of a cash balance retirement plan for certain new members of the Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System, the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana, and the Louisiana School Employees' Retirement System hired on or after July 1, 2013. The bill passed committee and eventually became Act No. 483. Opponents to the Act filed suit in district court; the district court declared the Act unconstitutional. Finding no error in the district court's analysis of the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Retired State Employees Association v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action before the Supreme Court, the issue for review concerned the validity of two legislative instruments enacted during the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (SCR 99) and 2012 La. Acts 2 (Act 2 or "Act"), each of which addressed funding and a mechanism for the state to pay for the tuition costs of elementary and secondary school students physically attending, or otherwise undertaking individual course work, from nonpublic schools. SCR 99 and Act 2 were challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying argument was that those legislative instruments diverted funds constitutionally reserved for public schools. Upon review of the record, the instruments themselves and the constitutional provisions at issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that once funds are dedicated to the state’s Minimum Foundation Program for public education, the constitution prohibits those funds from being expended on the tuition costs of nonpublic schools and nonpublic entities. Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court found the procedures employed to enact SCR 99 violated the constitution inasmuch as that legislative instrument was intended to have the effect of law, but several requirements for enacting law were not observed. Furthermore, after severing the unconstitutional provisions of Act 2, the Court held that Act 2 did not violate the constitution's "one-object" rule. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Broussard sued the State for damages he sustained from an accident caused by a misaligned elevator. After a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in Broussard’s favor, finding the offset between the elevator and lobby floors presented an unreasonable risk of harm. The district court reduced Broussard’s damages in proportion to his assigned percentage of fault. The court of appeal held the jury’s factual determination that the elevator’s defective condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm was manifestly erroneous because the defect was open and obvious, and reversed. The Supreme Court granted Broussard’s writ to further examine, under the manifest error doctrine, whether a defective condition is more properly considered an open and obvious hazard where no duty is owed, rather than an unreasonably dangerous condition where comparative fault is applicable. After reviewing the applicable law and the record in its entirety, the Court found the jury’s unreasonable risk of harm determination was not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the District Court's judgment in its entirety. View "Broussard v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (specifically La. R.S. 23:1036) as the exclusive remedy for a volunteer firefighter in claims for personal injury against the "fire company," similarly applies to claims for personal injury against fellow volunteer members. After reviewing the record and the law, the Court found the defendant failed to establish that the Workers’ Compensation Law granted immunity to fellow volunteer members of a volunteer fire company from suits in tort. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Champagne v. American Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law