Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

n 1993, AT&T Corporation and affiliate corporations (collectively, AT&T) filed an affiliated group, Mississippi income tax return with the Mississippi Department of Revenue f/k/a Mississippi State Tax Commission, using the statutorily-permissible "combined method" of reporting. But from 1994 to 1996, AT&T filed its returns under the "consolidated method" of reporting, which was then statutorily available only to affiliated groups with members doing business and taxable solely in Mississippi, ostensibly to challenge the constitutionality of this distinction. Following an audit in 1997, the Commission issued an Assessment of Income Taxes of more than $5 million against AT&T. After unsuccessful administrative appeals before the Commission, AT&T filed a "Petition for Appeal of Additional Income Tax Assessment Ordered by State Tax Commission, For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and For Refund of Overpayment of Tax" in the Chancery Court of Hinds County. The Petition challenged the constitutionality of several tax statutes under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and sought associated relief. But AT&T's Petition was not 'accompanied with a bond, to be approved by the clerk . . . , in a sum double the amount in controversy[,]" as then required by Mississippi Code Section 27-7-73. Rather, AT&T paid the Assessment, then filed the Petition. Preliminarily, the chancery court found that AT&T had "properly appealed" the full Commission's Order. The chancery court then held that the subject tax statutes violated the Commerce Clause; that the"offensive limitations" were to be struck so that AT&T was granted the "tax benefits" enjoyed by other taxpayers; and, based thereon, that AT&T was entitled to an award of $12,727,174. Thereafter, the Commission appealed those rulings, while AT&T appealed only the chancery court's interest calculations. Because AT&T did not follow the then-applicable procedure for appeal, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear its appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the chancery court and reinstated the Commission's order. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. AT&T Corporation" on Justia Law

James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

To pursue claims against Microsoft for alleged violations of the Mississippi antitrust and consumer-protection laws, Attorney General Jim Hood signed a contingency-fee contract with Hazzard Law, LLC, which, in turn, associated other law firms to assist with the litigation. The chancery court dismissed the antitrust claims, but allowed the consumer-protection claims to proceed. The parties eventually signed a settlement agreement that required Microsoft to provide up to $60 million in vouchers for Mississippi residents, and to pay the State of Mississippi $50 million in cash. However, the settlement agreement provided that $10 million of the cash money was to be distributed to the trust account of one of the outside lawyers in Houston, Texas. State Auditor Stacey Pickering wrote Hazzard, stating that payment of settlement funds directly to outside counsel violated Mississippi law. And because the same issue was pending in circuit court in another case, the auditor reserved all objections to the settlement until after the courts resolved the issue. Hazzard responded by filing a petition in chancery court, seeking approval of the attorney-fee payment. The auditor intervened in order to investigate and recover any public funds improperly withheld, misappropriated, or illegally spent. The auditor also filed a motion to have the $10 million held in trust disbursed to the State. The chancellor ruled in favor of Hazzard and ordered the settlement funds distributed directly to Hazzard and other retained counsel. The auditor appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General cross-appealed, claiming the Auditor's intervention was untimely. The chancery court held that the payment was proper. But because the law required that outside counsel retained by the Attorney General be paid from his contingent fund or from other funds the Legislature appropriated to his office, and because the Mississippi Constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury," the Supreme Court reversed.

This interlocutory appeal presented the issue of whether a volunteer fire department incorporated under the Mississippi Non-Profit Corporation Act is a "political subdivision" under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and thus immune from liability. The volunteer fire department argued immunity for itself and its employee, asserting it was a "body corporate. . . responsible for governmental activities" under the MTCA's definition of "political subdivision." However, plaintiffs Milton and Brenda Spotts argued that the volunteer fire department was an independent contractor with Lowndes County and was not entitled to immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the volunteer fire department did not meet the definition of a political subdivision, as the term "body corporate" does not mean any corporate body, but a public corporate body. Furthermore, the Court found that the volunteer fire department was acting as an independent contractor with the county. Thus, the volunteer fire department and its employee did not have immunity for their alleged acts of negligence.

The Lee County Chancery Court entered a decree approving and ratifying, with modifications, an annexation ordinance adopted by the City of Tupelo. Notices of appeal were filed by Lee County, Mississippi; the Belden Fire Protection District, the Palmetto-Old Union Fire Protection District, the Unity Fire Protection District (the Fire Protection Districts); and the City of Saltillo, Mississippi. Tupelo adopted an annexation ordinance on July 3, 2007, which sought to extend and enlarge Tupelo's boundaries to include seven proposed areas, totaling approximately 16.2 square miles, identified as Area 1, Area 2 North, Area 2 South, Area 3, Area 4, Area 5, and Area 6 ("PAAs" or "annexed territory"), each of which lies adjacent to Tupelo's current municipal limits. Lee County, the Fire Protection Districts, and Saltillo, along with the Town of Plantersville, Mississippi, each filed answers and objections to Tupelo's annexation petition. Because the chancery court's findings were based on substantial, credible evidence, were not manifestly wrong, and were well within the chancery court's discretion, and because the chancery court did not employ an erroneous legal standard, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Chancery Court.

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation petitioned the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board to determine the propriety of costs that Kelly Oil Company was attempting to charge to Anadarko as a nonconsenting owner in a force-integrated drilling unit. The Board determined that all costs Kelly Oil was attempting to charge were properly chargeable. The chancery court affirmed the Board's order, and Anadarko appealed. Because the Board's order contained insufficient reasoning and findings of fact for the Supreme Court to conduct an adequate review, the Court vacated the Board's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Town Creek Water Management District of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties ("Town Creek") appealed a decision of the Lee County Chancery Court that awarded compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest to the Webbs for Town Creek's wrongful taking of the their property. The case was before the trial court on remand from the Supreme Court's reversal of an earlier grant of summary judgment for Town Creek, with an instruction to conduct a trial on all issues. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by limiting the trial to damages alone, rather than holding a trial on all issues. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the Lee County Chancery Court for a trial on all issues.

In September 2007, Henry Phillips murdered Doris Shavers in the home they shared. The heirs of Shavers sued the City of Jackson ("the City"), claiming the actions of its police officers caused Shavers's death. The City moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). The circuit court denied the City's motion, and the City brought this interlocutory appeal. The question before the Supreme Court was whether there was a genuine issue of dispute that the City, through its police officers, acted in reckless disregard of Shavers's safety, thereby exposing the City to liability. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, the City did not act with reckless disregard. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the City.

The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) issued a subpoena to Pikco Finance, Inc. (Pikco), requesting documentation pertaining to Pikco's nonpayment of finance company privilege taxes. Pikco filed a petition to quash the subpoena on the basis that MDOR's ability to audit and tax under Mississippi's Finance Company Privilege Tax law was preempted by the National Bank Act. The circuit court granted Pikco's petition to quash, and MDOR appealed. The issue on appeal was whether MDOR's use of its statutory subpoena power in administration of the Finance Company Privilege Tax was preempted by the National Bank Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that Pikco was subject to the subpoena.

William and Sarah Smith are the grandparents of Jason Wells. Jason's mother, Tara Wells, is Sarah's daughter. The Smiths filed a petition for temporary and permanent custody of Jason. They later filed a separate petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of Tara and Robert Johnson, the biological father. The chancellor declined to terminate Tara's and Robert's parental rights but awarded the Smiths primary custody of Jason. In awarding the Smiths custody, the chancellor found that Tara had "by her long and continuous absences from [Jason] failed to exercise her parental rights and fulfill her parental responsibilities." He found that this had caused the Smiths to assume the role of parents to Jason for virtually his entire life and that the Smiths thus stood in loco parentis. The chancellor then conducted a best-interest, "Albright" analysis and concluded that Jason should remain with the Smiths. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the chancellor found that the natural-parent presumption under "Albright" had been overcome based on the doctrine of loco parentis (which would have been in error), or based on a finding of desertion by Tara which necessitated the Smiths standing as in loco parentis for Jason. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the latter and therefore affirmed the judgment of the chancery court.