Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jennifer Restivo was skateboarding on a residential street in Petaluma, California, when her skateboard wheel caught in a large crack, causing her to fall and sustain a serious arm injury. She alleged that the City of Petaluma was negligent in maintaining the street and that the city had sufficient notice of the dangerous condition to repair it before her accident. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court found that there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the city's notice of the dangerous condition. The court noted that the city had maintained records of complaints about city streets for over ten years and had received no complaints about the street in question. Additionally, the city engineer testified that the city had conducted inspections of the street and found no significant issues that required repair.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the city had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court emphasized that the city's inspection and maintenance practices, including the bi-annual pavement condition reports and subsequent inspections, did not reveal the specific crack that caused the plaintiff's fall. The court also noted that the plaintiff's expert's opinion did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the city had notice of the dangerous condition.The main holding of the appellate court was that the city did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's injury, and therefore, the city was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries. The judgment in favor of the city was affirmed. View "Restivo v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Marc A. Lesperance was found with his dog off-leash in Baxter Woods, Portland, despite a city ordinance requiring dogs to be leashed from April 1 to July 31. A park ranger informed Lesperance of the rule, but Lesperance refused to comply. The ranger, after consulting with a colleague, issued a summons and complaint. The District Court (Portland) fined Lesperance $500, noting it was not his first violation of the ordinance.Lesperance appealed, arguing that the park ranger was not authorized to issue the summons and complaint. He also claimed the city ordinance was preempted by state law and unconstitutionally vague. The court found these arguments without merit, stating the ordinance was clear and not preempted by state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court considered whether the park ranger, appointed as a constable, needed to meet specific training requirements to enforce the ordinance. The Attorney General, representing the Maine Criminal Justice Academy, suggested that constables might require less rigorous training than law enforcement officers. The court applied the "de facto officer" doctrine, concluding that Lesperance could not challenge the ranger's authority based on potential training deficiencies. The court affirmed the judgment, validating the ranger's actions as those of a de facto officer. View "City of Portland v. Lesperance" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Richland Correctional Institution, Kimani E. Ware, sought a writ of mandamus to compel Richland County Sheriff Steve Sheldon to provide public records he requested, including a booking report, use-of-force reports, and policies on inmate grievances and use of force. Ware also sought statutory damages and court costs.Ware sent his public-records request in October 2022, and the sheriff's office responded in November 2022. However, there was conflicting evidence regarding the completeness of the sheriff's response. Ware claimed that the sheriff did not provide the inmate-grievance policy and use-of-force policy, and that the sheriff provided incident reports instead of the requested use-of-force reports. Ware filed his mandamus complaint in December 2023, and the sheriff moved to dismiss, which was denied by the court. Both parties submitted evidence, but only Ware filed a timely merit brief.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found discrepancies in the evidence provided by Ware, suggesting that Ware may have altered the response letter from the sheriff's office. The court determined that Ware did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the sheriff failed to provide the requested records. Consequently, the court denied Ware's claim for a writ of mandamus and his requests for statutory damages and court costs. The court also denied motions from both parties for leave to file additional evidence. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V. (Miya) filed a lawsuit under the Transparency and Expedited Procedure for Public Records Access Act (TEPPRA) against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the Board). Miya sought access to public records related to a canceled water infrastructure project. The Board, established by Congress in 2016, refused to provide the requested documents, claiming TEPPRA did not apply to it. Miya then sued the Board in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.The district court dismissed Miya's case, ruling that the Board was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, which extends to Puerto Rico. The court applied the arm-of-the-state test and concluded that the Board, as an entity funded by the Commonwealth and with judgments paid by the Commonwealth, shared Puerto Rico's immunity. The court also determined that the Commonwealth did not waive this immunity through TEPPRA, as the statute did not meet the strict standards required to effect such a waiver under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's findings, holding that Puerto Rico's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to the Board and that the Commonwealth did not waive this immunity through TEPPRA. The court emphasized that a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be unequivocally expressed in the statute's text, which TEPPRA did not do. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Miya's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V. v. Financial Oversight and Management Board" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued an order requiring most television and radio broadcasters to compile and disclose employment-demographics data to the FCC, which would then post the data on its website. Petitioners, a group of broadcasters and associations, challenged the order, arguing that the FCC lacked statutory authority for such a requirement, and that it violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights, and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.The FCC reinstated the collection of employment-demographics data in February 2024, ending a 22-year hiatus. The data collection, through Form 395-B, was intended to monitor industry trends and report to Congress. The FCC had previously collected this data until 2002, when it was suspended following a court ruling that found certain FCC regulations unconstitutional. The FCC's new order also included amendments to Form 395-B, such as adding non-binary gender categories and expanding job categories.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FCC lacked statutory authority to require broadcasters to submit Form 395-B. The court explained that the FCC's broad public-interest authority must be linked to a distinct grant of authority from Congress, which was not present in this case. The court also rejected the FCC's argument that the 1992 Cable Act ratified its authority to collect Form 395-B data, noting that the Act tied this authority to equal employment opportunity regulations that were no longer in effect.The Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the FCC's order, concluding that the FCC did not have the statutory authority to mandate the collection and disclosure of employment-demographics data from broadcasters. View "National Religious Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

In April 2021, David Browne visited Billy Jack’s Saloon and Grill in Dewey-Humboldt, Arizona. After leaving the bar, Browne, with a blood alcohol content nearly four times the legal limit, caused a multi-vehicle collision on State Route 69. Victor Sanchez-Ravuelta, Janette Dodge, and their two minor children, Elijah and Amelia, were injured in the crash. The plaintiffs alleged that the Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses and Control (the Department) was negligent in failing to prevent Billy Jack’s from overserving its patrons.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the State of Arizona, the Town of Dewey-Humboldt, and Yavapai County. The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the claims against all defendants. The court found that the plaintiffs’ notice of claim to the County and Town was insufficient and that the Department did not have a legal duty to protect the plaintiffs from the harm caused by Browne’s actions. The court dismissed the minor plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice and the adult plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the Department owed a statute-based duty of care to the plaintiffs. However, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Department did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court found that the statutes cited by the plaintiffs did not impose a mandatory duty on the Department to prevent the overserving of patrons. The Supreme Court vacated parts of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the adult plaintiffs’ claims against the State with prejudice. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the Town’s cross-appeal. View "SANCHEZ-RAVUELTA v YAVAPAI" on Justia Law

Suqin Xia, a citizen of China, has lived unlawfully in the United States for over thirty years. She applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application, citing discretionary reasons. Xia then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.The district court dismissed Xia's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding an application made under § 1255. The court concluded that the denial of Xia's application was a "judgment" under this statute, thus precluding judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the denial of an application for adjustment of status under § 1255 is a "judgment" for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS. Consequently, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to review Xia's claims, affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. View "Xia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A minor collision involving a United States Postal Service (USPS) vehicle and Michael Le resulted in severe consequences. Michael Le, who had advanced ankylosing spondylitis, was struck by a USPS vehicle while backing out of his driveway. The collision caused his car to accelerate and crash into a neighbor's house. Le was hospitalized, underwent spinal surgery, and became a quadriplegic. He later developed complications, including an esophageal tear and infections, leading to further medical issues and amputations. Le and his wife filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States and USPS, alleging negligence by the USPS driver.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas conducted a bench trial and found the government liable for the damages. The court awarded significant damages to Michael Le for past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, and intangible damages, as well as to his wife for loss of consortium and services. The government filed a post-judgment motion for remittitur, arguing that the damages were excessive, but the district court denied the motion, finding the awards reasonable given the unique facts of the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no clear error in the determination of liability or the calculation of damages. The court upheld the awards for past and future physical pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, and disfigurement, noting that the district court's findings were supported by the evidence and within the bounds of reasonable recovery. The appellate court also rejected the government's argument that Michael Le's death during the appeal nullified the damages awards, affirming that the awards persisted as part of his estate. View "Le v. United States" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the authority of the Red Lake Watershed District (the District) to conduct improvement proceedings for Polk County Ditch 39, which lies within the District but under the drainage authority of the Polk County Board of Commissioners. In 2017, landowners filed a petition with the District to improve Ditch 39, aiming to increase its capacity and length to capture overflow from another ditch, Ditch 66. The District accepted the petition and initiated proceedings, but Keystone Township and several landowners challenged the District's order, arguing that the District lacked authority as the ditch was not transferred from the county.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Keystone, ruling that the District did not have the authority to order the improvement because it had not taken over the ditch from the county. The court of appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the District had the authority to conduct the improvement proceedings and that the proceedings substantially conformed to statutory requirements.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The court held that under Minn. Stat. § 103D.625, subd. 4, the District was authorized to conduct improvement proceedings for Ditch 39 without first taking over the ditch from the county. The court also concluded that the District's proceedings conformed to the statutory requirements, despite the involvement of county officials being inconsistent with the Watershed Law. The court rejected Keystone's procedural challenges, including the timeliness of the property owners' report and the final hearing notice, affirming that these did not affect the District's authority to establish the improvement project. View "In the Matter of Keystone Township vs. Red Lake Watershed District," on Justia Law

The Village of Morrisville, Vermont, sought to renew its federal license to operate a hydroelectric project in the Lamoille River Basin. The project had been in operation since 1981. Morrisville applied for a water quality certification from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, which is required under the Clean Water Act for projects that may result in discharges into navigable waters. After lengthy discussions and two rounds of revisions, Vermont issued a conditional water certification. Dissatisfied with the conditions, Morrisville argued that Vermont waived its certification authority by allowing Morrisville to withdraw and resubmit its application twice.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that Morrisville had unilaterally withdrawn and resubmitted its application to negotiate more favorable conditions, rather than at the behest of the state. FERC concluded that there was no evidence of a coordinated scheme between Morrisville and Vermont to delay the certification process. Consequently, FERC determined that Vermont did not waive its statutory certification authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC's decision. The court found that Morrisville's actions were unilateral and in its own interest, and there was no mutual agreement with Vermont to delay the certification process. The court distinguished this case from Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, where there was a clear agreement to delay certification. The court concluded that Vermont did not waive its certification authority and denied Morrisville's petitions for review. View "Village of Morrisville, VT v. FERC" on Justia Law