Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs John and Jane Doe appealed an order granting the State Department of Justice's special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. In their lawsuit, the Does alleged civil rights violations, negligence, false/wrongful arrest, defamation, and loss of consortium, against the State as well as the City and County of San Diego. Over many years, State agents allegedly caused John Doe to register as a sex offender through threats of enforcement, maintained him on California's sex offender registry, and publicly disseminated his name as a registered sex offender, including via the Megan's Law Web site. In 2014, John was arrested and charged with failing to register as a sex offender. Subsequently, John allegedly determined for the first time that he was not required to register as a sex offender because his prior sex offense convictions had been reversed on appeal. The State DOJ contended the Does' causes of action arose from protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and the Does did not show a probability of prevailing. The Court of Appeal agreed with the state: agents' threats to arrest/prosecute John involved and furthered protected speech and petitioning activity. The protected activity also involved public issues or issues of public interest. The Does did not show a probability of prevailing on their causes of action. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the special motion to strike. View "Doe v. California" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an application Mercury Casualty Co. (Mercury) filed in 2009 to increase its homeowners’ insurance rates. In denying the increase Mercury requested, the California Insurance Commissioner (the commissioner) made two decisions at issue on appeal. The commissioner determined: (1) under subdivision (f) of section 2644.10 of title 10 of the California Code of Regulations, Mercury’s entire advertising budget had to be excluded from the calculation of the maximum permitted earned premium because “Mercury[] aims its entire advertising budget at promoting the Mercury Group as whole” rather than “seek[ing] to obtain business for a specific insurer and also provid[ing] customers with pertinent information” about that specific insurer; (2) Mercury did not qualify for a variance from the maximum permitted earned premium under subdivision (f)(9) of section 2644.27 because “Mercury failed to demonstrate the rate decrease [that resulted from application of the regulatory formula] results in deep financial hardship.” Mercury and certain insurance trade organizations ("the Trades") unsuccessfully sought to challenge the commissioner’s decision in the superior court. On appeal, Mercury and the Trades raised three main issues: (1) the commissioner and the superior court erred in interpreting and applying section 2644.10(f) with regard to what constitutes institutional advertising expenses; (2) the Trades contended section 2644.10(f) violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because the regulation imposed a content-based financial penalty on speech; and (3) Mercury and the Trades contended the commissioner and the superior court erred in determining that Mercury did not qualify for the constitutional variance because the commissioner and the court wrongfully applied a “deep financial hardship” standard instead of a “fair return” standard. Finding no merit in these arguments, or any of the other arguments offered to overturn the judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Mercury Casulaty Co. v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the notice and time requirements of the Right to Repair Act (the act), Civil Code section 895 et seq. The Court granted petitioner William Blanchette's petition for a writ of mandate and directed that the trial court vacate its order staying proceedings pending Blanchette's compliance with the act. Blanchette's compliance with the act was relieved by virtue of real party GHA Enterprises, Inc.'s (GHA) failure to timely acknowledge receipt of Blanchette's notice of a claim. "Contrary to GHA's argument, the act's goal of promptly resolving claims without resort to litigation cannot be achieved by permitting homebuilders to serve tardy responses to claims or to ignore them entirely." View "Blanchette v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement (CONA) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of San Diego and Todd Gloria (in his capacity as former interim mayor of San Diego (collectively, the City)). CONA sued the City in 2013 for an alleged public nuisance caused by noxious sea lion waste odors permeating the La Jolla Cove. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, finding: (1) the City did not have a duty to prevent harms caused by wild animals; (2) there was no triable issue that the City's conduct caused the alleged nuisance; and (3) Civil Code section 3482 barred nuisance liability.1 CONA challenges these rulings on appeal and argues the City cannot avail itself of immunity under Government Code section 831.2. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, finding, as the trial court found, there was no triable issue as to causation. To the extent CONA's mandamus cause of action rested on an independent duty arising from documents issued by the former mayor, the Court likewise find no triable issue those documents gave rise to a legal duty for the City to act. View "Citizens Odor etc. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The issues presented by this case concerned the effects of the elimination of a tax increment and dissolution of the Santa Ana Redevelopment Agency on the five stipulated judgments.Petitioners Hilda Cuenca, Claudia Castaneda, Enimia Hernandez, and Evangelina Avalos, and Habitat for Humanity of Orange County (cumulatively, Cuenca) sought a writ of mandate to overturn the Department of Finance’s determination that approximately $30 million set aside under the stipulated judgments was unencumbered and must be remitted to the county auditor-controller. The trial court affirmed DOF’s determination except for a $3.5 million loan pledged to Habitat for construction of 17 affordable houses. On appeal, Cuenca contended: (1) the five stipulated judgments were enforceable obligations under the Dissolution Law; (2) the tax increment moneys set aside under the stipulated judgments remain available for use by the Santa Ana Redevelopment Agency’s housing successor; (3) the stipulated judgments were contracts subject to protections of the contract clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, and the Dissolution Law may not require the diversion of tax increment moneys to the county auditor-controller; and (4) DOF’s “taking of $30 million in pre-dissolution tax increment violated the California Constitution. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Cuenca v. Cohen" on Justia Law

The Public Employment Relations Board (the Board or PERB) concluded the Orange County Water District (the District) committed an unfair practice when it refused to consent to an election petitioned for by the recognized employee organization seeking to implement a so-called modified agency shop. The proposed agency shop in this case was referred to as a "modified" agency shop because it would apply only to future employees hired into the bargaining unit and not apply to current employees. The District filed a petition for a writ of extraordinary relief from the Board’s decision under Government Code section 3509.5(a). The Court of Appeal granted a writ of review but denied extraordinary relief. The Court held that section 3502.5 authorized the proposed modified agency shop. View "Orange Co. Water Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In a longstanding dispute between Central San Joaquin Water Conservation District (Central), which supplies surface water to agricultural customers, and Stockton East Water District (Stockton East), which operates the conveyance system through which the water flows, the trial court was required to determine whether the compensation demanded by Stockton East for transporting (wheeling) Central’s water was “fair” under the provisions of Water Code section 1811 (c). Stockton East sought a wheeling rate of approximately $40 per acre-foot of water, an amount sufficient to recover 38 percent of all costs of owning and operating the conveyance system, in which 38 percent of the water flow was for Central’s benefit. Central disagreed and argued the rate should reflect the incremental costs directly resulting from the additional water flowing through the conveyance system, making use of the capacity that would otherwise go unused, a much lower rate. The trial court found the Wheeling Statutes (Wat. Code § 1810 et seq.) had to be read as a whole and the language read in light of the purposes and policies of the statutes to facilitate the voluntary exchange of water, noting that the Legislature could have provided for a pro rata cost allocation but chose to omit reference to any specific formula or methodology and instead set forth a number of factors that must be considered in setting a wheeling rate. In light of the statutory language, rates must be set on a case-by-case basis, and in this case, Stockton East failed to consider all of the appropriate factors, including incremental costs and the value of offsetting benefits from the wheeling. The rates set ran counter to an analysis of competitive pricing and violated the statutes’ directive that such rates be reasonable. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluded that the trial court’s determination was supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied the relevant statutes. View "Central San Joaquin Water v. Stockton East Water Dist." on Justia Law

In 2013, a golf ball struck Miguel Leyva in the eye while he and his wife, Socorro Leyva, walked along a public path adjacent to the Bonita Golf Club. The Leyvas appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Crockett and Company, Inc., the owner and operator of the Club. The Leyvas contended Crockett was not entitled to summary judgment because the immunities designated in Government Code section 831.41 and Civil Code section 846 did not apply to their tort claims. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 831.4 barred their action, therefore affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "Leyva v. Crockett & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a quarter horse trainer, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. Specifically, petitioner challenges a license suspension and fine imposed upon him by the Board after finding that he violated regulations, California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 1844, subdivision (e)(9), by racing horses medicated with a drug, Clenbuterol, that the Board had temporarily suspended from authorized use. The court concluded that the Board's interpretation of the regulation at the time it extended or reenacted the Clenbuterol ban and in the instant litigation is not entitled to deference because the Board has vacillated. The court explained that, after considering the regulation's text and history, a temporary suspension of authorized use of a particular substance under section 1844.1 may not be extended beyond 12 months through reenactment or extension of the temporary suspension. Therefore, the allegations against and findings of regulatory violations by plaintiff had no legal basis, and the penalties imposed upon him were equally invalid. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "De La Torre v. California Horse Racing Board" on Justia Law

Government Code section 53094(b) authorizes “the governing board of a school district” to “render a city or county zoning ordinance inapplicable to a proposed use of property by the school district,” under certain circumstances. The Santa Clara County Board of Education approved a resolution exempting from local zoning ordinances property to be used by Rocketship Education for a charter school. The San Jose Unified School District argued that county boards of education have no authority to issue section 53094 zoning exemptions and successfully sought a writ of mandate to set aside the resolution. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that section 53094 does not authorize county boards of education to issue zoning exemptions for charter schools. Empowering county boards to issue zoning exemptions for charter schools would not advance the purpose of section 53094—preventing local interference with the state’s sovereign activities. While county boards are authorized to issue charters and oversee charter schools, local school districts are obligated to provide facilities to charter schools. (Educ. Code, 47614(b).) The state has not tasked county boards with acquiring sites for charter schools; to the extent they do so, they are not carrying out a sovereign activity on behalf of the state. View "San Jose Unified School District v. Santa Clara County Office of Education" on Justia Law