Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, the Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC) issued an advisory opinion stating that the contribution limits in Alaska’s campaign finance law were unconstitutional as applied to contributions to independent expenditure groups. In 2018, three individuals filed complaints with APOC alleging that independent expenditure groups had exceeded Alaska’s contribution limits. APOC declined to enforce the contribution limits based on its advisory opinion. The individuals appealed to the superior court, which reversed APOC’s dismissal of the complaints and ordered APOC to reconsider its advisory opinion in light of a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. APOC appealed, arguing that it should not have been required to enforce laws it viewed as unconstitutional and that its constitutional determination was correct. Because the Alaska Supreme Court found it was error to reverse APOC’s dismissal of the complaints, it reversed the superior court’s order. View "Alaska Public Offices Commission v. Patrick, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus seeking to place a referendum on the November 2021 ballot asking voters to approve or disapprove an amendment to the Liberty Township Zoning Resolution, holding that the Delaware County Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or disregard clearly applicable law in sustaining a protest to the referendum petition.The board of elections sustained the protest to the referendum petition because the petition did not include an adequate summary of the zoning amendment as required by Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). Relator, Scott Donaldson, sought this writ of mandamus ordering the board of elections to place the referendum on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the board of elections abused its discretion or disregarded clearly applicable law in sustaining the protest to the referendum petition. View "State ex rel. Donaldson v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In 1999, Agpawa pleaded guilty to federal felony mail fraud. In 2002, he completed his sentence. Agpawa ran for mayor of the City of Markham in 2017. There were no preelection challenges to Agpawa’s nominating petitions, but Cook County State’s Attorney Foxx sent Agpawa a letter stating that he was ineligible to serve as mayor because of his felony conviction. Agpawa won the election. Foxx filed a complaint, alleging that Agpawa had been convicted of an “infamous crime” and was prohibited from holding municipal office unless he received a presidential pardon under the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/29-15. The appellate court affirmed judgment for Foxx.Agpawa sought relief from then-Governor Rauner, who issued a document that purported to be a “RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP ROGER AGPAWA.” Agpawa took the oath of office as Markham's mayor. The court vacated its earlier order. No appeal was taken. In 2020, Agpawa sought reelection. Opponents objected. The Markham Municipal Officers Electoral Board ruled in favor of Agpawa. The appellate court reversed. A subsequent amendment to the Election Code specifically refers to a restoration of rights by the governor.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board ruling. While the governor has no constitutional authority to pardon a federal conviction, the governor has statutory authority to mitigate the collateral electoral consequences of such a conviction by issuing a restoration of rights. Governor Rauner’s untitled document restored Agpawa’s Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office. The court rejected arguments that the Illinois legislature had no authority to alter the effect of a federal conviction and that the statutory amendment violated the special legislation clause, was “void for vagueness,” should not be applied retroactively, and violated first amendment rights, the equal protection clause, and separation of powers principles. View "Walker v. Agpawa" on Justia Law

Two petitions reached the Idaho Supreme Court, both seeking to declare two statutes unconstitutional and to issue extraordinary writs: a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition. First, Michael Gilmore sought a declaration that Idaho Code section 34-1805(2), as amended by SB 1110, violated the people’s constitutional initiative and referendum rights. SB 1110 requires that, for an initiative or referendum to appear on the ballot, organizers must obtain a threshold number of signatures from “each of the thirty-five (35) legislative districts” in the state. Gilmore argued this violated the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution and unconstitutionally divides the people’s legislative power. Gilmore also petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the Idaho Secretary of State “not to implement” the statute as amended. In the second petition, Reclaim Idaho (“Reclaim”) and the Committee to Protect and Preserve the Idaho Constitution, Inc. (“the Committee”), sought a declaration that the new signature threshold mandated by SB 1110, requiring signatures from every legislative district, was unconstitutional. They also challenged the constitutionality of another statute, Idaho Code section 34-1813(2)(a), amended in 2020, stating that an initiative may not become effective earlier than July 1 of the year following the vote in which it was passed. Reclaim and the Committee contended both amended statutes nullify the people’s fundamental constitutional right to legislate directly. They also sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Secretary of State from enforcing these statutory provisions. After review, the Supreme Court: (1) dismissed Gilmore's petition because he lacked standing; (2) granted Reclaim and the Committee's petition in part by declaring that section 34-1805(2) violated Article III, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, and the SOS and Legislature failed to present a compelling state interest for limiting that right. Furthermore, the Court declared section 34-1813(2)(a), violated Article III, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution because it infringed on the people’s reserved power to enact legislation independent of the legislature. Accordingly, the Court granted Reclaim and the Committee’s petition for a writ of prohibition preventing the Secretary of State from enforcing this provision. View "Reclaim Idaho/Gilmore v. Denney" on Justia Law

Petitioners Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, David Shawver, Brooke Paz, Ryan Hoskins, and Amanda McGuire brought two petitions for writ of mandate challenging the constitutionality of legislative amendments made to the procedures governing the recall of state officers. Petitioners began a recall proceeding in April 2017 with the aim of obtaining certification in August 2017 for the November 2017 election. The Legislature changed the law in June 2017 by passing Senate Bill No. 96 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Petitioners filed a writ petition in case No. C085176, challenging the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 96 on single-subject grounds. The Court of Appeal issued an order temporarily staying the enforcement of the amendments to the Elections Code effected by Senate Bill No. 96. On August 24, 2017, the Legislature enacted similar revisions to the recall procedures by adopting Senate Bill No. 117 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), a bill providing for appropriations related to the budget bill. Petitioners filed a writ petition in case No. C085381, challenging the retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 117’s Elections Code amendments, arguing the amendments impaired their right to a speedy recall, denied them due process, and were not a valid budget-related bill that could be passed by a majority vote and take effect immediately. The Court of Appeal consolidated both cases and issued an order directing the parties to address the following question: “Does the Legislature of the State of California have the authority to (1) amend the budget bill by a majority vote, and (2) adopt ‘other bills providing for appropriations related to the budget bill’ to become effective immediately by a majority vote.” The parties complied. After review, the Court of Appeal found no grounds upon which it could grant relief, and denied both petitions. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Weber" on Justia Law

In 2015, the City of Santa Fe, New Mexico amended its Campaign Code to enact disclosure requirements for campaign spending. Plaintiff Rio Grande Foundation was a non-profit organization based in Albuquerque that has engaged in political advocacy since 2000. In 2017, it participated in a Santa Fe election, advocating against a ballot measure concerning a proposed soda tax. Combined spending by advocacy groups on each side of the measure amounted to several million dollars. Plaintiff’s expenditures totaled an estimated $7,700, most of which was attributable to the production of a YouTube video and a website. Those expenditures gave rise to a letter from a City Assistant Attorney informing Plaintiff that it appeared Plaintiff would need to file a campaign finance statement. The day after Plaintiff received that letter, the Santa Fe Ethics and Campaign Review Board (“ECRB”) received a citizen complaint lodged against Plaintiff, triggering an ECRB investigation. Because production of the YouTube video and website was donated in-kind, Plaintiff assumed that it did not need to disclose any information under the Code. The ECRB determined otherwise, citing Plaintiff for failure to comply with the Campaign Code. No penalties or fines were imposed, however. Plaintiff was simply ordered to file the required paperwork. Plaintiff did not think it or advocacy groups like it should have to endure the disclosure requirements in the future. It brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendants, seeking only prospective relief: namely, a declaration that section 9-2.6 of the Campaign Code was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to Plaintiff, insofar as it was enforced against speech concerning ballot measures. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the Campaign Code and its enforcement by the ECRB, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rio Grande Foundation v. City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, et al." on Justia Law

Proposition 13 and Proposition 218 amended the California Constitution to require that any special tax adopted by a local government entity take effect only if approved by a two-thirds vote of the electorate. The court of appeal recently interpreted these constitutional provisions “as coexisting with, not displacing, the people’s power to enact initiatives by majority vote” and held that a measure placed on the ballot as a local citizens’ initiative requires a majority, not a supermajority, vote to pass.Sixty percent of San Franciscans voting on Proposition G— an initiative entitled “Parcel Tax for San Francisco Unified School District”—approved the measure. San Francisco filed suit to establish that Proposition G was valid. The complaint against “All Persons Interested” was answered by Nowak, who argued that Proposition G is invalid because it failed to garner the two-thirds vote required by Proposition 13 and Proposition 218. Nowak also contended that a provision of Proposition 218 unique to parcel taxes, (art. XIII D, 3(a)), requires a two-thirds vote of the electorate to enact Proposition G. Nowak sought to distinguish the earlier decisions on the grounds that Proposition G was conceived and promoted by local government officials and was not a valid citizens’ initiative. The court of appeal rejected all of Nowak’s arguments, standing by its earlier decisions. View "City & County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Matter of Prop. G" on Justia Law

Indiana’s Act 442 allowed election officials to remove a voter from the state’s voter rolls automatically (without directly contacting the person) based on information acquired through a third-party database, “Crosscheck,” which provided the voter lists of multiple states. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Act 442 was preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. 20507(d), which requires hearing directly from that voter or providing notice to the voter that he would be removed from the rolls if he did not respond and failed to vote in the next two federal general elections.Indiana replaced Act 442 with Act 334, ending Indiana’s participation in Crosscheck in favor of the Indiana Data Enhancement Association, which is functionally identical to Crosscheck. The Act makes county officials responsible for deciding whether to remove a name, deleting Act 442’s requirement that county officials automatically remove the voter from the rolls. Act 334 instructs county officials to determine: whether a presumptive match in another state “is the same individual who is a registered voter of the county”; whether the registration in another state occurred after the presumptively matching Indiana registration; and whether the voter “authorized the cancellation of any previous registration” when the voter registered in the second state.The Seventh Circuit held that Act 334 is also preempted; it renders inapplicable the rule that a voter must personally authorize the cancellation of her registration before the county official may take that step. View "Common Cause Indiana v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

A recall committee submitted an application to the Alaska Division of Elections seeking to recall the governor, citing lack of fitness, incompetence, and neglect of duties as grounds. The director refused to certify the application, asserting that it was not legally or factually sufficient. The committee challenged the director’s decision in superior court. That court granted summary judgment for the committee, deciding that except for one allegation, which it struck, the allegations in the committee’s application were legally and factually sufficient. The committee was allowed to move on to the second phase of signature-gathering on its recall petition; if it was successful, the director would call a special election to allow the voters to decide whether the governor should be recalled. The State appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision in a summary order with an opinion to follow. By this opinion, the Supreme Court explained why the committee’s recall application satisfied the legal requirements for presentation to the voters. View "Alaska Division of Elections v. Recall Dunleavy" on Justia Law

Alyse Galvin was an Alaska Democratic Party nominee for office, but registered as a nonpartisan voter. She sued to stop the state Division of Elections from sending out already-printed ballots for the 2020 general election, arguing that the Division’s ballot design, by omitting her nonpartisan voter registration, violated both a statutory directive to designate a candidate’s party affiliation on the ballot and Galvin’s right to free political association under the Alaska Constitution. After the superior court issued a temporary restraining order, the Division petitioned for review. But the following day, the superior court denied Galvin’s request for a preliminary injunction; the Alaska Supreme Court granted her emergency cross-petition for review and affirmed the superior court’s decision in a summary order with this explanation to follow. The Court concluded the Division’s evidence supported the superior court’s factual finding that granting Galvin’s requested injunction would have jeopardized the prospects of a successful and timely election. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvin’s requested preliminary injunction because granting the injunction could have imperiled the public interest in an orderly and timely election. View "Alaska Division of Elections v. Galvin" on Justia Law