Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Anton’s Services Inc. was a subcontractor on two public works projects in San Diego: the Torrey Pines Road Project and the Voltaire Street Project. On both projects, Anton’s classified its workers under the “Tree Maintenance” prevailing wage category, paying them accordingly. The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) investigated and determined that Anton’s work was construction-related and should have been classified under the “Laborer (Engineering Construction)” category, which carries a higher prevailing wage. Additionally, Anton’s failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, including submitting contract award information, employing the required ratio of apprentices, and requesting apprentices from local committees.After the DLSE issued civil wage and penalty assessments for both projects, Anton’s challenged these findings in administrative proceedings before the Director of Industrial Relations. The parties submitted stipulated facts and documentary evidence. The Director affirmed the DLSE’s assessments, finding Anton’s had misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was liable for penalties and liquidated damages. The Director also found Anton’s violations were willful, given its prior record and lack of prompt correction.Anton’s then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of San Diego County through a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court, applying the substantial evidence standard, upheld the Director’s decision and rejected Anton’s attempt to introduce extra-record evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the administrative record for substantial evidence. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Anton’s misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was properly assessed penalties and liquidated damages. The court clarified that liquidated damages are owed until wages are actually paid to workers, not merely withheld by a contractor. The judgment was affirmed. View "Anton's Services v. Hagen" on Justia Law

A group of Maine lobstermen challenged a state rule requiring all federally permitted lobster fishers to install electronic tracking devices on their vessels, which transmit GPS location data whenever the vessels are in the water. This rule was adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) to comply with an addendum to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Fishery Management Plan. The addendum aimed to reduce risks to North Atlantic right whales, improve fishery data, and support regulatory enforcement. The tracking devices must remain powered and transmit data at all times, including when vessels are docked or used for personal purposes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that the MDMR Rule violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as equal protection and state administrative law. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the lobster fishery is a closely regulated industry and the rule was not unreasonably invasive. The court noted several concessions by the parties, including that the GPS tracking constituted a search, that the lobster industry is closely regulated, and that the search was administrative in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the lobster industry is a closely regulated industry and that the administrative search exception, as articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), applied. The court found that the MDMR Rule satisfied the Burger test: it served a substantial government interest, warrantless searches were necessary to the regulatory scheme, and the rule provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Thompson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Elliott Land Developments LLC sought to rezone approximately 31.8 acres of property owned by Michael and Winona Aguzin in Jackson County, Mississippi, from agricultural (A-1) to single-family residential (R-1) in order to develop a subdivision. The Jackson County Planning Commission held a hearing, where both supporters and opponents presented evidence and arguments. Elliott Land relied on a Land Use Report showing recent development, improved infrastructure, and a purported public need for more housing. Several residents opposed the rezoning, citing concerns about drainage, traffic, and a desire to maintain the rural character of the area. The Planning Commission recommended approval of the rezoning.An adjacent property owner, Marisa Lamey, appealed the Planning Commission’s recommendation to the Jackson County Board of Supervisors. Elliott Land challenged the sufficiency and timeliness of Lamey’s notice of appeal, but the Board chose to hear the appeal. After a hearing with testimony from multiple residents, the Board of Supervisors voted four-to-one to deny the rezoning application, finding insufficient evidence of a change in the character of the neighborhood or a public need for rezoning. Elliott Land appealed to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the appeal was not properly before the Board. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding it was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the appeal was properly before the Board of Supervisors, that the question of whether Elliott Land met its burden was fairly debatable based on substantial evidence from both sides, and that the Board’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Elliott Land Developments, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Two private-citizen members of a federally created commission, along with several federal officials, were involved in planning the United States’ 250th anniversary celebrations. The commission was established by Congress and included both federal officials and private citizens appointed by congressional leaders. After a dispute over leadership and the selection of an administrative secretariat, three commission members made public statements criticizing the commission’s Chairperson and Executive Director, alleging mismanagement and other misconduct. The Chairperson and Executive Director claimed these statements damaged their reputations and led to their removal, prompting them to file a tort action—including defamation and related claims—against the three members in Pennsylvania state court.After the complaint was filed, the Attorney General certified that the defendants were acting within the scope of their federal employment, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and substituted the United States as the defendant under the Westfall Act. The District Court determined that the commission members qualified as federal employees, that their statements were made within the scope of their employment, and that discovery was unnecessary. The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, as the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not waive sovereign immunity for defamation claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that the commission is a federal agency under the FTCA and Westfall Act, and that its private-citizen members are “employees of the government” for purposes of those statutes. The court further held that the defendants’ statements were made within the scope of their employment and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery. The dismissal was affirmed because sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Giordano v. Hohns" on Justia Law

A nonprofit corporation purchased a 192-unit apartment complex from a government agency in 1994 at a significant discount. In exchange, the purchaser agreed by contract to rent all units at below-market rates to low-income families for 40 years and to comply with annual reporting and administrative fee requirements. Around 2016, the purchaser stopped fulfilling these obligations, including the reporting and fee provisions. The government’s successor agency, through its monitoring agent, notified the purchaser of the breach and initiated legal action seeking remedies under the contract.The purchaser counterclaimed in state court, seeking a declaration that the agreement was no longer enforceable and an injunction against further enforcement. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as successor to the original government agency, intervened, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and moved to dismiss the counterclaim. The purchaser argued that the contract’s obligations ended when Congress repealed the statute that created the original agency and authorized such agreements. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the contract remained enforceable, dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the contract’s plain language required the purchaser to comply with its obligations for the full 40-year term, regardless of the repeal of the underlying statute. The court found that the FDIC, as successor, retained both contractual and statutory authority to enforce the agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the counterclaim, concluding that the agreement remains enforceable and the purchaser is still bound by its terms. View "Affordable Housing Group, Inc. v. Florida Housing Affordability, Inc." on Justia Law

Turkish steel producers, including Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S., were subject to a countervailing duty (CVD) order after the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that the Turkish government subsidized steel rebar exports. During an administrative review, Commerce found that Kaptan sourced steel scrap, a key input for rebar, from several affiliates, including Nur, a shipbuilder. Commerce initially determined that Nur’s steel scrap was primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production, making Nur a cross-owned input supplier whose subsidies should be attributed to Kaptan, thereby increasing Kaptan’s CVD rate.The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed Commerce’s decision after Kaptan challenged the cross-attribution of Nur’s subsidies. The CIT found that Commerce had not adequately explained whether steel scrap was merely a link in the rebar production chain or addressed prior cases treating steel scrap as a byproduct. The CIT remanded the case for further explanation. On remand, Commerce developed a multi-factor analysis and ultimately reversed its position, finding that Nur’s steel scrap was a common, unprocessed input used in various products and industries, and that Nur’s primary business activity—shipbuilding—was not dedicated almost exclusively to producing rebar. As a result, Commerce concluded that Nur was not a cross-owned input supplier, and Kaptan’s CVD rate was reduced to a de minimis level. The CIT sustained Commerce’s remand decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision for abuse of discretion and Commerce’s remand findings for substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce’s determination that Nur’s steel scrap was not primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production was adequately explained, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with the applicable regulation. View "KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US " on Justia Law

Several landowners in Walton County, Florida, owned beachfront properties that were affected by a county ordinance enacted during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March and April 2020, the county first closed public beaches, then issued a new ordinance that closed all beaches—public and private—making it a criminal offense for anyone, including private owners, to access or use their own beachfront property. The ordinance was enforced by law enforcement officers who entered private property, excluded owners, and threatened arrest for violations. The ordinance remained in effect for about a month, after which it expired and was not renewed.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, raising several claims, including a Takings Clause claim under the Fifth Amendment, and seeking both damages and prospective relief. The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot, finding the ordinance had expired and was unlikely to recur. On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment to the county on all damages claims, holding that the ordinance was not a per se physical taking but rather a use restriction, and that the government’s actions during a public health emergency were entitled to deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims for prospective relief, agreeing that the ordinance’s expiration rendered those claims moot. However, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Takings Clause claim, holding that the ordinance constituted a per se physical taking because it barred owners from their property and allowed government officials to physically occupy and control access. The court remanded for a determination of just compensation, holding that no public emergency, including COVID-19, creates an exception to the Takings Clause. View "Alford v. Walton County" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, a major water conveyance initiative. Several municipal, tribal, and public interest groups objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this geotechnical work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The plaintiffs asserted that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the overall project and that separating it constituted impermissible “piecemealing” under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Sacramento County agreed with the plaintiffs, issuing preliminary injunctions that barred DWR from conducting geotechnical work before submitting a certification of consistency. The court found that the geotechnical work was part of the covered action under the Delta Reform Act and that DWR’s project description in its Environmental Impact Report (EIR) included this work. The court also determined that the plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits and would suffer procedural harm if the injunction was not granted.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in geotechnical work that precedes construction. The court reasoned that the purposes of CEQA and the Delta Reform Act differ, and the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s whole-of-the-action requirement or prohibition against piecemealing. The court directed the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunctions and reconsider the motions in light of this interpretation. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project.The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law

A state agency, the Department of Family and Community Services (DFCS), leased office space from JBG Memorial (JBG) in Anchorage under a fifteen-year agreement set to expire in February 2023, with options to renew. As the lease neared expiration, DFCS applied for and received a waiver from the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT&PF) commissioner to procure new office space through a single source process, bypassing the usual competitive bidding. DFCS informed JBG that it would not renew the lease and would vacate, but did not provide details about the new lease. JBG requested public records but did not receive them before the lease expired. DFCS remained in the property on a month-to-month basis until it entered a new lease at Anchorage Business Park. JBG received the requested records only after the new lease was signed.JBG filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, seeking to enjoin the termination of its lease, void the new lease, and require proper bid procedures. JBG also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent DFCS from vacating. The State moved to dismiss, arguing JBG had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. JBG admitted it had not done so but claimed exhaustion was excused due to lack of meaningful access, bias, futility, and irreparable harm. The superior court dismissed the complaint, finding JBG had not pled facts sufficient to excuse exhaustion, and awarded attorney’s fees to the State as the prevailing party.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that JBG was required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review and failed to establish any valid excuse for not doing so. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the State. View "JBG Memorial, LLC v. State of Alaska, Department of Transportation and Public Services" on Justia Law