Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Walmart, Inc. ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Dianna Hixson temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on the basis of State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), holding that Klein applies prospectively only.Before the Supreme Court issued Klein, the Commission awarded Hixson TTD compensation. After Klein was released, Walmart, Hixson's former employer, filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the termination of Hixson's TTD compensation after the date notified Walmart of her retirement. The court of appeals granted the writ, concluding that the Commission abused its discretion by awarding TTD compensation for the period following Hixson's retirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Klein does not apply retroactively and should be applied prospectively only. View "State ex rel. Walmart, Inc. v. Hixson" on Justia Law

In this original action involving a dispute between Relator, Lake County Clerk of Courts Faith Andrews, and Respondents, the seven judges of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, the Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition vacating Respondents' May 2022 journal entry and prohibiting the judges from imposing similar restrictions against Relator without jurisdiction, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.Relator's alleged misconduct within the clerk's office led Respondents to issue a journey entry in May 2022 that banned Relator from entering the Lake County courthouse except for one day per month. Relator brought this action seeking writs of prohibition, mandamus, or quo warrant to prevent the judges from interfering with her execution of her duties at the courthouse, where the clerk's office was located. The Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition vacating Respondents' journal entry, issued a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to vacate the May 2022 entry, and denied as moot Relator's request for a writ of quo warranto, holding that Respondents effectively removed Relator from her office without jurisdiction to do so. View "State ex rel. Andrews v. Lake County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

Deborah Dorr requested to reopen an unemployment appeal hearing that was to address Dorr’s appeal of the Idaho Department of Labor’s (“IDOL”) decision denying Dorr’s request to backdate her Pandemic Unemployment Assistance claim. After Dorr failed to appear at the hearing, IDOL dismissed her appeal and subsequently denied her request to reopen the hearing. Dorr appealed IDOL’s denial of her request to reopen, and the Idaho Industrial Commission (“the Commission”) affirmed. The Commission determined due process was satisfied and agreed with IDOL that Dorr’s own negligence was insufficient cause to reopen the hearing. Appealing pro se, Dorr petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for relief. The Supreme Court concluded Dorr’s briefing did not meet the standard for an appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) and as such, her arguments were forfeited. The Commission’s decision upholding the Appeal Examiner’s denial of Dorr’s request to reopen her appeal hearing was affirmed. View "Dorr v. IDOL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Appellant temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation after sustaining a work injury, holding that the Commission's order was neither unsupported by evidence in the record nor was it contrary to law.Appellant gave Appellee two weeks' notice of her intention to resign and subsequently sustained a work injury. The Commission awarded Appellant TTD compensation. The court of appeals granted a writ ordering the Commission to reverse its decision because Appellant had resigned from her employment prior to her injury. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), the court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the decision in Klein did not redefine voluntary abandonment of the workforce as voluntary abandonment of the injured worker's position; and (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that, but for her work injury, Appellant would have remained gainfully employed. View "State ex rel. Ohio State University v. Pratt" on Justia Law

McIntosh, employed by the Department of Defense, was responsible for approving travel expenses for government contracts. McIntosh, on several occasions refused to approve invoices and refused to provide contract information to her coworkers. Her supervisor, Boswell, informed McIntosh that her actions amounted to a “refus[al] to perform [her] job requirements.” McIntosh filed grievances, alleging that she was being forced to disclose unauthorized information and was harassed. The agency investigated and denied McIntosh’s grievances. McIntosh took sick leave for the day of her scheduled performance review, before Boswell’s retirement. Boswell requested medical documentation. McIntosh returned to work after Boswell retired. Cohen became her supervisor. Upon her return, McIntosh submitted a letter from her doctor, stating that she “should be excused from work due to illness from 3/22/2017 through 3/24/2017.” Employee Relation determined that the documentation was not acceptable. McIntosh never provided additional documentation but reiterated her grievances and requested reassignment. She declined to speak to Cohen and went home. Cohen placed McIntosh on paid leave and issued a Notice of Proposed Removal. The deciding official, Van Winkle, sustained the removal.The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, finding that the Department would have removed McIntosh even absent her protected whistleblowing activity. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Board’s administrative judges are improperly appointed principal officers under the Appointments Clause and that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s decision. View "McIntosh v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

Abbey Dickerson appealed to the Judicial Department Personnel Board of Review (“Board”) after she was terminated by the Eighteenth Judicial District (“District”). As required by the Personnel Rules, the Board appointed an attorney (who happened to be a retired court of appeals judge) to serve as the hearing officer on her case. Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer changed the disciplinary action to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The District then appealed to the Board, but the Board affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Because the District remained concerned about Dickerson’s suitability to return to her position, however, it sought review of the Board’s final order by filing a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim in Denver district court. The question presented by this case for the Colorado Supreme Court asked whether the Board was either a “governmental body” or a “lower judicial body” within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), such that its decision to affirm, modify, or reverse a disciplinary action could be challenged in district court. The Supreme Court held that the Personnel Rules precluded district court review of a final order by the Board. View "Colorado Judicial Dept. 18th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Shouse was terminated from his employment as a captain of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO, the Department, or respondent), following an administrative hearing. Findings on the record reflected petitioner engaged in improper sexual relationships with subordinates under his command, misappropriated county equipment and electronic mail for his personal use, was insubordinate in violating a direct order prohibiting him from contacting any person with whom he had had a personal relationship during the pendency of the investigation, and unbecoming conduct discrediting the Sheriff’s Department. Following an administrative appeal, the findings were sustained. Petitioner petitioned for writ of mandate seeking review of his dismissal, and, upon denial of that petition, he appealed. The sole legal issue presented was whether petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Public Safety Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBRA) were violated where the investigation into his alleged improper conduct was not completed within one year of discovery. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Shouse v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying a motion for summary judgment filed by Adam Goodman and Paul Underwood (collectively, Petitioners) in this personal injury case arising from an accident in which Blake Auton was injured, holding that the allegations against Petitioners were those of pure negligence, which were barred by workers' compensation immunity.In its order denying summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Goodman was action within the scope of his employment while he was driving a garbage truck that backed over Auton and that additional discovery was required relating to Underwood's actions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction for the circuit court to grant summary judgment to Petitioners, holding (1) Petitioners were both clearly acting in furtherance of their employer's business when the accident occurred; and (2) therefore, workers' compensation immunity barred the cause of action and entitled Petitioners to summary judgment. View "Goodman v. Auton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decisions of the lower tribunals resolving Claimant's permanent total disability (PTD) claim in his favor after denying his petition to reopen his occupational pneumoconiosis permanent partial disability (OP PPD) claim for further evaluation, holding that the lower tribunals erred in part.At issue in the instant consolidated appeals were Claimant's attempt to reopen his OP PPD claim for further evaluation and his claim for permanent total disability (PTD) due to his various impairments. While Claimant's PTD claim was still being litigated, he unsuccessfully filed two petition to reopen his OP PPD claim. The lower tribunals denied Claimant's reopening petitions but awarded him PTD. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) W. Va. Code 23-4-16(e) does not preclude reopening of a permanent disability claim because another permanent disability claim is pending; and (2) the lower tribunals were not clearly wrong in determining that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled. View "Delbert v. Murray American Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Nathaniel Sheehan lost his job during the COVID-19 pandemic. He applied for and began receiving unemployment benefits. This appeal arose out of the Idaho Department of Labor’s (“IDOL”) later determination that Sheehan was: (1) ineligible for unemployment benefits; and (2) required to repay the benefits he had already received. Sheehan represented himself throughout this case. He appealed these decisions to the Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”), claiming he had received misleading instructions concerning notice from IDOL. The Commission dismissed his appeal and later denied his motion for reconsideration. Sheehan then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. "While Sheehan presents a poignant story rife with compelling circumstances, we are bound to follow the rules and law of jurisdictional authority." The Court affirmed the Idaho Industrial Commission. View "Sheehan v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law