Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Kansas State Board of Healing Arts (Board) filed a formal disciplinary action against Dr. Amir Friedman that resulted in an order of the Board revoking Friedman's license to practice medicine and surgery in the state. The district court upheld the Board's order. Friedman appealed, raising several issues, including the question of whether the Board had jurisdiction to initiate a revocation proceeding after Friedman's license had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board had jurisdiction to revoke Friedman's license because Friedman was practicing medicine under the authority of a license issued by the Board when he committed the misconduct at issue in the revocation proceeding; and (2) substantial evidence supported the administrative hearing officer's initial order and the Board's final order. View "Friedman v. State Bd. of Healing Arts" on Justia Law

The Workers Compensation Board awarded Plaintiff benefits under the Workers Compensation Act for an injury he sustained while operating a go-cart at an event sponsored by his employer (Employer). Employer and its insurance carrier (Insurer) appealed the award, claiming that Plaintiff's injuries were not compensable because they were sustained during a recreational or social event that Plaintiff was not required to attend. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether Plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and the error was not harmless. Remanded to the Board to make the determination based on the statutory criteria of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(f). View "Douglas v. Ad Astra Info. Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Corporation owned a club with exotic dancers who were treated as independent contractors rather than employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance. In 2005, the Department of Labor determined that the dancers were employees. A hearing officer upheld the determination, concluding that the dancers received wages for services and therefore, the dancers were employees under the Kansas Employment Security Law (KESL). The district court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the relationship between provisions in the KESL as they existed before amendments that took effect in 2011 and common-law rules used to determine the existence of employee status. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the determinative question in this case was whether the dancers had the status of employees under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship. Because the critical common-law factor in this analysis is the employer's right of control over the employee and her work, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the dancers were employees, where Corporation possessed such a right of control over the club's dancers. View "Milano's, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Claimant sustained an injury while working for Employer. During the course of the workers compensation proceedings, it was confirmed that Claimant was an unauthorized alien. An ALJ denied Claimant's claim for permanent partial general work disability based on public policy grounds, concluding that awarding an unauthorized alien a work disability would be inconsistent with the Workers Compensation Act's legislative intent. The Workers Compensation Board disagreed and awarded Claimant a fifty-nine percent work disability, concluding that the Act's plain language did not prohibit an unauthorized alien from receiving an award for work disability. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's award of work disability, holding that, under the statutes in effect when Claimant was injured in this case, Claimant's immigration status did not preclude her from receiving work disability compensation. View "Fernandez v. McDonald's" on Justia Law

An officer arrested Appellant, suspecting Appellant was intoxicated. After performing two field sobriety tests, Appellant refused to take the evidentiary breath test the officer requested. The Kansas Department of Revenue suspended Appellant's driving privileges for one year under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1014(a)(1), which provides that privileges can be suspended for refusing to take a breath test the arresting officer is authorized to request. The district court affirmed Appellant's suspension, concluding that a reasonable officer could have believed it was more than a possibility that Appellant operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Appellant's driving privileges, holding (1) the officer's statutory authority to request Appellant to take the breath test depends upon a valid arrest; (2) the arrest was invalid in this case because the officer had no probable cause to support it; and (3) Appellant's refusal to take a breath test the officer had no statutory authority to request could not be the basis for suspending his driving privileges under section 8-1014(a)(1). View "Sloop v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested for driving on a suspended license. Upon the arresting officer's request, Appellant refused to take a breath test. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently suspended Appellant's driving privileges for one year under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1014(a). The district court affirmed the administrative suspension, relying upon State v. Counseller in its decision. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated Appellant's driving privileges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer's authority to request Appellant to take the breath test depended upon an arrest for an alcohol-related driving offense, rather than simply an arrest for any offense involving operation of a motor vehicle; (2) Appellant's refusal to take a breath test the officer had no statutory authority to request could not be the basis for suspending his driving privileges under section 8-1014(a); and (3) therefore, Counseller was reversed, and Appellant's driving privileges reinstated. View "Shrader v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Kan. Stat. Ann. 2011 Supp. 8-1002(c) provides that where a driver's license is being suspended because an illegal blood-alcohol level has been established by a blood test, the officer shall serve notice of the suspension "by mailing the notice." This driver's license suspension case involved the question of whether the phrase "mailing the notice" requires the officer who conducted the alcohol testing to personally deliver the notice of a driver's license suspension to the custody of a mail carrier or may instead follow his or her office's standard operating procedures for outgoing mail. The Supreme Court held (1) the statute imposes the responsibility to ensure mailing on the officer but does not require the officer to personally address, stamp, and place in a mailbox an envelope containing the notice; and (2) in this case, the officer ensured mailing by following the sheriff's standard operating procedure for mailing the notice and, thus, fulfilled the statutory requirement. In so holding, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that reversed the district court, although the Court's analysis was different from that of the court of appeals. View "Byrd v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant, a medical doctor practicing medicine in Kansas and Missouri, appealed from the district court's order denying her petition to revoke an administrative subpoena issued by the Kansas Board of Healing Arts. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that Appellant was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district court under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-2839a(b)(3)(B). On the merits of the appeal, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition based on its conclusion that the Board had authority under the Kansas Healing Arts Act to investigate and subpoena Appellant, a Kansas licensee who was practicing under the Act, even though the investigation was based upon her practice of medicine in Missouri. View "Ryser v. State" on Justia Law

Kathryn Swank's driver's license was suspended after a police officer arrested Swank for suspicion of driving under the influence. When the officer found Swank, she had pulled into a driveway and was already out of her car. Swank admitted she had been drinking, but the officer did not ask Swank if she had consumed any alcohol after she pulled into the driveway. Swank then tested positive to a breath test. Swank filed a petition for judicial review of the agency decision. The district judge ruled in Swank's favor and set the agency order of suspension aside. At issue on appeal was the appropriate role, if any, for evidence and legal argument regarding post-driving alcohol consumption. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the evidence demonstrated the existence of the officer's reasonable grounds and that Swank's post-driving alcohol consumption could not be considered because it was not among the legal issues enumerated in Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(h)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider Swank's testimony about her post-driving alcohol consumption. Remanded.

On July 1, 2010, the legislature enacted the Kansas Indoor Clean Air Act. The Act generally prohibits smoking in public places but exempts Class B clubs, premises operated for profit to which members resort for the consumption of food or alcoholic beverages, as long as the clubs were so licensed as of January 1, 2009. Downtown Bar & Grill was not licensed as a Class B club on January 1, 2009, and thus was ineligible for a smoking ban exemption under the Act. Downtown Bar brought this declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to declare that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause and to accordingly issue temporary and permanent injunctive relief. The trial court agreed, holding that the cut-off date of January 1, 2009 was arbitrary, which therefore meant the statute could not be rational. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that the statute was not rational; and (2) therefore, Downtown Bar was unable to establish an element essential to issuance of a temporary injunction: a substantial likelihood of eventual success on the merits. Remanded.