Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Five separate lawsuits were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion. County administrators and registers of deeds in Allendale, Beaufort, Colleton, Hampton, and Jasper Counties (collectively, Respondents) filed suit against MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.; Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. (MERS); and numerous banking institutions (collectively, Petitioners). Respondents contended Petitioners engaged in a practice of fraudulent recordings that have disrupted the integrity of the public index Respondents were statutorily required to maintain. Petitioners moved to dismiss, arguing Respondents "lack contractual standing," the lawsuit was barred by section 30-9-30 of the South Carolina Code (2007), the parties could designate MERS as mortgagee, and the complaints failed to state a cognizable claim. The motion was denied, and Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court found that Respondents failed to state a claim and therefore reversed the trial court's denial of Petitioners' motion to dismiss. View "Kubic v. MERSCORP" on Justia Law

Respondents were former South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) agents who retired and were rehired by then SLED Chief Robert Stewart for a period of four years pursuant to a rehire program formulated by Chief Stewart. At the conclusion of Respondents' service under the rehire program, they filed suit against SLED and the State under various theories, all premised on the allegation that SLED deducted from their salaries the amount of the employer's contribution to the retirement system. The State was granted dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. On appeal, taking the allegations of the Complaint as true, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand and following discovery, the trial court granted SLED summary judgment, which the court of appeals reversed. Having carefully reviewed the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court properly granted summary judgment to SLED, because the record made clear that Respondents were rehired at reduced salaries and the employer contributions to the retirement system were not deducted from those salaries, but were paid by SLED. As a result, the Court reversed the court of appeals and directed that judgment be entered for SLED. View "Grimsley v. SLED" on Justia Law

Diane and Otis Bass had three children: Brittany, Hanna, and Alex. All three children were special needs, but Hanna and Alex were also autistic. Otis worked outside the home, and Diane cared for the children. Due to their forms of autism and their other cognitive issues, both Hanna and Alex were prescribed Clonidine to help them sleep at night, in addition to other medications. A compounding pharmacy filled the Clonidine prescription. In April 2008, the prescription was inadvertently mixed at one thousand times the recommended concentration. Diane administered the wrongly compounded Clonidine to Hanna and later to Alex. Both children had serious reactions that required hospitalization. DSS received a report that two special needs children were in the hospital due to "possible poisoning by parents." The agency assigned an overall danger rating of "medium" to the case. A caseworker assigned to the case recommended the children be removed from the Bass home and placed with Diane's sister, Linda. Linda would later learn that the compounding pharmacy improperly filled the Clonidine prescription. Linda notified DSS, and the agency subsequently concluded that the medication was the cause of the children's hospitalization. This revelation led to the eventual return of the children to Diane and Otis. However, DSS continued to make announced and unannounced visits at the Bass home through the end of 2008 and refused to remove its finding that Diane and Otis "harmed their children" from the agency's file on Petitioners. Petitioners filed a lawsuit against DSS, the compounding pharmacy, and the pharmacist, alleging negligence and gross negligence, and seeking actual and punitive damages. After settling with the pharmacy and the pharmacist, Petitioners served DSS with an amended complaint alleging causes of action for gross negligence, defamation, and outrage, and sought actual damages. DSS moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of Petitioners' case, and again at the conclusion of all of the evidence. The trial judge denied both motions. At the conclusion of the evidence, Petitioners withdrew their defamation cause of action, and moved for a directed verdict regarding DSS's defenses of discretionary immunity and negligence of a third party. The trial judge granted Petitioners' motions for directed verdict as to those defenses. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Petitioners, and awarded them $4 million in damages. DSS subsequently filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), for new trial absolute, and to reduce the verdict. The trial court issued an order denying DSS's post-trial motions. However, the trial court granted DSS's motion to reduce the verdict. The court of appeals reversed the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding the trial court did not err in its decision. View "Bass v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

After the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) failed to produce public documents requested by Appellant Edward D. Sloan, Jr., Sloan filed s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against DOR and its director, James Etter, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. After suit was filed, the DOR produced the requested information and asserted that Sloan's action was mooted and should have been dismissed. The trial court agreed with the DOR and dismissed the complaint, denying all relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to Sloan. Despite the DOR's failure to comply with the requirements of FOIA, the Court held the trial court properly found that Sloan's request for a declaratory judgment was mooted when the DOR produced the requested information. Sloan contended, however, that the claim for declaratory relief remained viable. Here, the Court disagreed: "the information Sloan sought has been disclosed, [and] there [was] no continuing violation of FOIA upon which the trial court could have issued a declaratory judgment." As the prevailing party under these circumstances, the trial court erred in not awarding Sloan his reasonable attorney's fees and costs. View "Sloan v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

The respondents, two developers and an architectural firm, Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W), entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the City of Columbia as part of a larger project team to develop a publicly-funded hotel for the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. The City eventually abandoned its plan under the MOU, and the respondents brought suit on several causes of action including breach of contract and equitable relief. The City moved for summary judgment arguing the MOU was not a contract and therefore the contract claims failed. The circuit court agreed and, rejecting the equitable claims as well, granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The respondents appealed and the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the MOU was comprised of agreements to execute further agreements, there was no meeting of the minds on numerous material terms which had not yet been defined. Accordingly, the court of appeals was reversed with respect to that portion of the court's judgment; the Supreme Court held the MOU was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court and reinstated its judgment in favor of the City. View "Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

In April 2003, the City of Columbia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W) and several other parties, to develop a publicly-funded hotel adjacent to the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. As architect, S&W was to complete sufficient preliminary design work to determine a guaranteed maximum price for the project, which would be used by the City to obtain municipal bond funding to cover the cost of the hotel. Pursuant to the MOU, the construction company was to pay S&W directly. On June 26, 2003, the City received a letter stating S&W would complete its preliminary design on July 10, 2003, and would then stop working until the bond financing for the hotel was finalized. Realizing this could delay the start of construction, S&W offered to continue working the remaining ninety days until the anticipated bond closing date of October 13, 2003, but required assurance it would be compensated for the work it performed during this time frame. It provided an estimate requiring $650,000 and $75,000 per week after that. On July 30, the City approved "$650,000 for interim architectural design services for a period of 90 days prior to bond closing." The bond closing did not occur as scheduled, but S&W nevertheless continued to work. S&W submitted an invoice to the City for $697,084.79 for work that took place from July 10 to December 15, 2003. By letter dated December 17, 2003, S&W informed the construction company that the City had voted that day "to advance [$705,000.000] to the design team for design services and expenses. Because under the MOU the construction company was to pay S&W, not the City, the construction company agreed to reimburse the City for the funds paid to S&W after the bond closing. The City paid S&W's invoice. S&W continued to work on the project, but in March 2004, the City abandoned its plans under the MOU and ended its relationship with S&W. S&W received no further compensation and sued the City for breach of contract under the MOU and the July 2003 agreement. The City argued there was no separate agreement and the payment of interim fees was merely an advance on fees under the MOU and furthermore, the MOU provided that S&W was to be paid by the construction company, not the City. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of S&W, finding a contract existed between it and the City. On certiorari, the City conceded a contract exists, but argued the contract terms have been satisfied. The Supreme Court found the City's arguments were unpreserved and affirmed as modified. View "Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

For about forty years, 100 and 200 children residing in the Mitford Community of Fairfield County have been attending Chester County School District (CCSD) schools in the Great Falls area of Chester County. The CCSD schools are closer to the Mitford Community than are any Fairfield County School District (FCSD) schools. The Mitford students have been attending CCSD schools at no cost to the students or their families. Mitford students' attendance at CCSD schools began as a result of a Federal 1970 desegregation order, which required the all African-American Mitford Elementary School be closed, and its students be given the choice of attending CCSD's Great Falls schools. The General Assembly passed Act No. 1236, consolidating the Mitford Community into CCSD. This Act was repealed the following year based on an agreement between FCSD and CCSD respecting the Mitford Community's students' enrollment in CCSD's schools. Under this agreement, FCSD paid CCSD $25,000 per year for educational expenses. This agreement ended in the 2009-10 school year when no agreement was reached for that year or thereafter. In light of the school districts' failure to reach an agreement for payment to CCSD for the cost of educating Mitford Community's students in CCSD's schools and FCSD's refusal to continue negotiations, the General Assembly passed Act No. 294 of 2010 in order to provide for a uniform arrangement between FCSD and CCSD. Pursuant to section 59-63-485(C), CCSD has invoiced the Fairfield County Treasurer for the expenses of educating the Mitford children for the past three school years. FCSD filed suit against the Respondents seeking a declaratory judgment that Act No. 294 was unconstitutional. CCSD, the State, and FCSD filed cross motions for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of Act No. 294. The circuit court issued an order denying FCSD's motion and granting CCSD and the State's motions for summary judgment, holding that Act No. 294 was constitutional special legislation, and FCSD appealed. In a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the Board of Trustees for the FCSD appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, CCSD, the Fairfield County Treasurer, and the State Department of Education. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Board of Trustees for the Fairfield County School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether autopsy reports are "medical records" under Section 30-4-20(c) of the South Carolina Code (2007), and therefore exempt from disclosure under the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act, Title 30, Chapter 4 of the South Carolina Code (the FOIA). The appellants brought a declaratory judgment action under the FOIA requesting production of an autopsy report from a coroner. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the coroner, finding the records were exempt from disclosure as medical records. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Perry v. Bullock" on Justia Law

On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. View "Harrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court answered certified two questions from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The case concerned supplemental health insurance policies, which differ from ordinary health insurance policies in both purpose and operation. The questions were: (1) whether the definition of "actual charges" contained within S.C. Code Ann. 38-71-242 be applied to insurance contracts executed prior to the statute's effective date; and (2) whether the South Carolina Department of Insurance could mandate the application of "actual charges" to policies already inexistence on the statute's effective dates by prohibiting an insurance company from paying claims absent the application of that definition. The South Carolina Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Kirven v. Central States" on Justia Law