Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Supreme Court
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The Investment Advisers Act makes it illegal to defraud clients, 15 U.S.C. 10b–6(1),(2), and authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to bring enforcement actions against investment advisers and against individuals who aid and abet violations. If the SEC seeks civil penalties, it must file suit “within five years from the date when the claim first accrued,” 28 U. S. C. 2462. In 2008 the SEC sought civil penalties, alleging that individuals aided and abetted investment adviser fraud from 1999 until 2002. The district court dismissed the claim as time barred. The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that the underlying violations sounded in fraud, so the “discovery rule” applied, and the limitations period did not begin to run until the SEC discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud. The Supreme Court reversed. The limitation period begins to run when the fraud occurs, not when it is discovered. In common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence. The discovery rule is an exception to the standard rule and has never been applied where the plaintiff is not a defrauded victim seeking recompense, but is the government bringing an enforcement action for civil penalties. The government is a different kind of plaintiff. The SEC’s very purpose is to root out fraud. The discovery rule helps to ensure that the injured receive recompense, but civil penalties go beyond compensation and are intended to punish. Deciding when the government knew or reasonably should have known of a fraud would also present particular challenges for the courts. View "Gabelli v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

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Under Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law, Ga. Code 31-7-75, political subdivisions may create special-purpose hospital authorities to exercise public and essential governmental functions, including acquiring public health facilities. The Albany-Dougherty County Authority owns Memorial, one of two hospitals in the county, and formed private nonprofit corporations (PPHS AND PPMH)to manage it. After the Authority decided to purchase the county’s other hospital and lease it to a PPHS subsidiary, the Federal Trade Commission issued an administrative complaint alleging that the transaction would violate the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The FTC and Georgia sought an injunction. The district court dismissed, citing the state-action doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Authority, as a local governmental entity, was entitled to immunity because the challenged anti-competitive conduct was a foreseeable result of the Law. The Supreme Court reversed. Georgia has not clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy allowing hospital authorities to make acquisitions that substantially lessen competition, so state-action immunity does not apply. State-action immunity is disfavored and applies only when it is clear that the challenged conduct is undertaken pursuant to the state’s own regulatory scheme. There is no evidence Georgia affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership. The Authority’s powers, including acquisition and leasing powers, simply mirror general powers routinely conferred by states on private corporations; a reasonable legislature’s ability to anticipate the possibility of anti-competitive use of those powers falls short of clearly articulating an affirmative state policy to displace competition. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

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Reimbursement providers for inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries is adjusted upward for hospitals that serve disproportionate numbers of patients who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services annually submit the SSI fraction for eligible hospitals to a “fiscal intermediary,” a Health and Human Services contractor, which computes the reimbursement amount and sends the hospitals notice. A provider may appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board within 180 days, 42 U. S. C. 1395oo(a)(3). The PRRB may extend the period, for good cause, up to three years, 42 CFR 405.1841(b). A hospital timely appealed its SSI fraction calculations for 1993 through 1996. The PRRB found that errors in CMS’s methodology resulted in a systematic under-calculation. When the decision was made public, hospitals challenged their adjustments for 1987 through 1994. The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that it had no equitable powers save those granted by legislation or regulation. The district court dismissed the claims. The D. C. Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed. While the 180-day limitation is not “jurisdictional” and does not preclude regulatory extension, the regulation is a permissible interpretation of 1395oo(a)(3). Applying deferential review, the Court noted the Secretary’s practical experience in superintending the huge program and the PRRB. Rejecting an argument for equitable tolling, the Court noted that for nearly 40 years the Secretary has prohibited extensions, except as provided by regulation, and Congress not amended the 180-day provision or the rule-making authority. The statutory scheme, which applies to sophisticated institutional providers, is not designed to be “unusually protective” of claimants. Giving intermediaries more time to discover over-payments than providers have to discover underpayments may be justified by the “administrative realities” of the system: a few dozen intermediaries issue tens of thousands of NPRs, while each provider can concentrate on its own NPR. View "Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

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Attorney Bormes alleged that the electronic receipt he received when paying his client’s federal-court filing fee on Pay.gov included the last four digits of his credit card number and the card’s expiration date, in willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U. S. C.1681. He sought damages and asserted jurisdiction under 1681p, and under the Little Tucker Act, which grants district courts jurisdiction for claims “against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded ... upon ... any Act of Congress,” 28 U. S. C. 1346(a)(2). The district court dismissed, holding that FCRA did not explicitly waive sovereign immunity. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the Little Tucker Act provided consent to suit because the underlying statute. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The Little Tucker Act does not waive sovereign immunity with respect to FCRA damages actions, but, with its companion statute, the Tucker Act, provides the government’s consent to suit for certain money-damages claims “premised on other sources of law,” Those general terms are displaced when a law imposing monetary liability has its own judicial remedies. Because FCRA enables claimants to pursue monetary relief in court without resort to the Tucker Act, only its own text can determine whether Congress unequivocally intended to impose the statute’s damages liability on the government. View "United States v. Bormes" on Justia Law

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The Civil Service Reform Act permits federal employees, subjected to serious personnel actions, to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U. S. C. 7701. “Mixed cases,” based on discrimination, are governed by the CSRA and MSPB and EEOC regulations. An employee may initiate a mixed case with the agency-employer or directly with the MSPB. The CSRA provides that review of MSPB decisions “shall be filed in the ... Federal Circuit,” except that discrimination cases may be filed in district court. Kloeckner, a Department of Labor employee, filed a hostile work environment complaint with the DOL civil rights office. Following EEOC regulations, DOL completed an internal investigation; Kloeckner requested an EEOC hearing. While the EEOC case was pending, Kloeckner was fired and brought her mixed case directly to the MSPB. Concerned about duplicative expenses, she successfully moved to amend her EEOC complaint to include her claim of discriminatory removal and asked the MSPB to dismiss without prejudice. The MSPB granted a right to refile by January 18, 2007. The EEOC case continued until April 2007, when it was terminated as a sanction for Kloeckner’s discovery conduct and returned to DOL, which ruled against Kloeckner. The MSPB dismissed Kloeckner’s appeal as untimely. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the only discrimination cases that could go to district court under 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(2) were those the MSPB had decided on the merits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Each referenced enforcement provision authorizes action in federal district court. Regardless of whether the MSPB dismissed on the merits or threw it out as untimely, Kloeckner brought the kind of case that the CSRA routes to district court. View "Kloeckner v. Solis" on Justia Law

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The district court entered a preliminary injunction concerning four provisions of Arizona S. B. 1070, enacted in 2010: Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; 5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed any offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.; and 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to attempt, in some circumstances, to verify immigration status. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted. Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, in which Congress has left no room for even complementary state laws. Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty is an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. 1324a(a)(1)(A),(a)(2); requires employers to verify prospective employees' status; and imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, but only imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. Congress decided against criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. Section 6 creates an obstacle to federal law by attempting to provide state officers with additional arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the federal government. Generally, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the U.S. It was improper to enjoin section 2(B) before state courts construed it and without some showing that its enforcement actually conflicts with federal law. The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. It is not clear yet that 2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay release of detainees for no reason other than to verify immigration status. That would raise constitutional concerns and would disrupt the federal framework, but the section could be read to avoid these concerns.

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In the 1970s the FCC began enforcing 18 U.S.C. 1464, which bans broadcast of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language." This case concerns two isolated utterances of obscene words during live broadcasts aired by Fox and an ABC television show during which the nude buttocks of an adult female character were shown for approximately seven seconds and the side of her breast for a moment. Under 2001 Guidelines, a key consideration was whether the material dwelled on or repeated at length the offending description or depiction. After these incidents, the FCC issued its Golden Globes Order, declaring that fleeting expletives could be actionable. It concluded that the broadcasts violated this standard. On remand, the Second Circuit found the policy unconstitutionally vague and invalid. The Supreme Court held that, because the FCC failed to give Fox or ABC fair notice prior to the broadcasts, its standards were vague as applied to the broadcasts. Although the FCC declined to impose a forfeiture on Fox and said that it would not consider the broadcasts in renewing licenses or in other contexts, it has statutory power to take prior offenses into account when setting a penalty, 47 U.S.C. 503(b)(2)(E), and due process protection against vague regulations "does not leave [regulated parties] ... at the mercy of noblesse oblige." The challenged orders could also have an adverse impact on Fox’s reputation with audiences and advertisers. The Court declined to address the constitutionality of the current indecency policy.

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Petitioner requested that the Secretary of the Interior take into trust on its behalf a tract of land known as the Bradley Property, which petitioner intended to use "for gaming purposes." The Secretary took title to the property and respondent subsequently filed suit under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., asserting that the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 465, did not authorize the Secretary to acquire the property because petitioner was not a federally recognized tribe when the IRA was enacted in 1934. At issue was whether the United States had sovereign immunity from the suit by virtue of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 86 Stat. 1176, and whether respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition. The Court held that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity from respondent's action under the QTA. The Court also held that respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition where respondent's interests came within section 465's regulatory ambit.

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An Indiana statute, the "Barrett Law," Ind. Code 36-9-15(b)(3), authorized Indiana's cities to impose upon benefited owners the cost of sewer improvement projects. The Law also permitted those lot owners to pay either immediately in the form of a lump sum or over time in installments. In 2005, the city of Indianapolis adopted a new assessment and payment method, the "STEP" plan, and it forgave any Barrett Law installments that lot owners had not yet paid. A group of lot owners who had already paid their entire Barrett Law assessment in a lump sum believed that the City should have provided them with equivalent refunds. At issue was whether the City's refusal to do so unconstitutionally discriminated against them in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Amdt. 14, section 1. The Court held that the City had a rational basis for distinguishing between those lot owners who had already paid their share of project costs and those who had not. Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no equal protection violation.

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Respondent gave birth to twins conceived through in vitro fertilization using her deceased husband's frozen sperm. Respondent applied for Social Security survivors benefits for the twins, relying on 42 U.S.C. 416(e) of the Social Security Act, which defined child to mean, inter alia, "the child or legally adopted child of an [insured] individual." The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, identified subsequent provisions of the Act, sections 416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C), as critical, and read them to entitle biological children to benefits only if they qualified for inheritance from the decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfied one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement. The Court concluded that the SSA's reading was better attuned to the statute's text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA's longstanding interpretation was not the only reasonable one, it was at least a permissible construction that garnered the Court's respect under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.