Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Michaud submitted a Right-to-Know request to the Town of Campton Police Department, seeking certain records pertaining to him, his address, or any member of his household. The Town denied his request, asserting that it was an attempt to circumvent the discovery process in a separate litigation between the parties. Michaud then filed a lawsuit against the Town to gain access to the requested records. The Town reiterated its justification for the denial, and the court stayed the Right-to-Know suit until the separate litigation reached a resolution. After the resolution of the other litigation, the court ordered the Town to respond to Michaud's requests. The Town provided some documents, but Michaud filed a motion to compel, claiming that not all records were produced. The court denied the motion, finding that the Town had complied with the order and that the withheld records were either already in Michaud's possession or were exempted from disclosure.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Town violated the Right-to-Know Law by categorically denying Michaud's request based on his motive and without first reviewing the records responsive to the request. The court concluded that the Town's initial response was not lawful and that the trial court erred in ruling that the Town's initial denial was lawful. The court also vacated the trial court's denial of Michaud's request for attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that to award attorney’s fees on remand, the trial court must find that the lawsuit was necessary to enforce compliance with the Right-to-Know Law and that the Town knew or should have known that its conduct violated the Right-to-Know Law. View "Michaud v. Town of Campton Police Department" on Justia Law

The case involves Mojalaki Holdings, LLC and GSSG New Hampshire, LLC (the plaintiffs) who appealed a decision by the City of Franklin Planning Board (the Board) that denied their site plan application to install a solar panel array on a piece of land owned by Mojalaki. The proposed solar panel array required the installation of new utility poles and the removal of mature trees to ensure sufficient sunlight. The land, which was mostly open space and was once a golf course, did not have any specific ordinance language addressing solar panel arrays. The Board, after multiple hearings and a site visit, denied the application based on concerns raised by neighbors about the project's potential impact on the scenery, property values, and previous negative experiences with other solar projects in the city.The Board's decision was upheld by the Superior Court, which agreed with the Board's first and third reasons for denial, namely that the installation of new utility poles would create an industrial look out of place in the neighborhood, and that cutting down mature trees contradicted the purpose provisions. However, the Superior Court did not uphold the Board's second basis, that the solar panel array endangered or adversely impacted the residents, due to lack of supporting facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Board could not rely solely on the purpose provisions to deny the application. The court found that the purpose provisions lacked sufficient specificity for site plan review and left the proposed project to be judged by the subjective views of the Board through ad hoc decision making. The court granted the plaintiffs a builder's remedy, allowing them to proceed with their development provided they comply with all other applicable regulations. View "Mojalaki Holdings v. City of Franklin" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the City of Claremont received a request for the disclosure of governmental records related to former police officer Jonathan Stone. Stone appealed a decision from the Superior Court ordering the City to disclose thirteen internal affairs investigation reports and four sets of correspondence between the New Hampshire Police Standards and Training Council (PSTC) and the City.Stone argued that the City violated a 2007 Stipulated Award when the City Manager sent a letter to a journalist responding to the request for certain government records. He also argued that the City Manager's letter incorrectly indicated the number of sustained reports that the City located pertaining to him, and that the City violated the Stipulated Award when it did not destroy certain internal affairs reports.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the 2007 Stipulated Award did not prohibit the disclosure of the requested records and that Stone waived any argument that the records would otherwise be exempt from disclosure. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to disclose the records. View "Stone v. City of Claremont" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the plaintiffs, two police officers injured in a shooting, filed a suit against Chester Arms, LLC (the seller of the firearm used in the shooting), and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) (which conducted the background check for the sale of the firearm). The suit accused Chester Arms of negligent entrustment and DOS of negligent entrustment and negligence per se. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the basis of immunity under state law. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The court of appeals found that the state law barring lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and sellers for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful use of their products by a third party was constitutional and not preempted by federal law. The court found that the law was designed to safeguard citizens' fundamental right to bear arms by limiting suits against the firearms industry, thereby protecting its solvency and ensuring law-abiding citizens have access to firearms. The court also found that the law did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection or right to a remedy.Regarding the suit against DOS, the court found that DOS had not been negligent in its background check as the shooter was not disqualified from owning a firearm at the relevant time under federal law. Therefore, the court concluded that any alleged error in the trial court's immunity analysis was harmless as DOS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed a decision by the New Hampshire Waste Management Council (Council) that had found the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) acted unlawfully in issuing a permit to North Country Environmental Services, Inc. (NCES) for the expansion of a landfill. The Council had ruled in favor of the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), which argued the permit did not meet the "capacity need" as required by law. The Supreme Court ruled that the Council erred in its interpretation of "capacity need" under RSA 149-M:11, V(d) and concluded that DES has the discretion to determine whether a capacity need exists. The Court also found that the CLF had standing to appeal the permit to the Council. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services; Appeal of North Country Environmental Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In a dispute between the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the New Hampshire Division of State Police (the Division), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed a lower court's decision permitting the ACLU's request for access to public records about a former state trooper under the Right-to-Know Law. The Division had argued that these records were exempt from disclosure under RSA 105:13-b and their release would constitute an invasion of privacy. The ACLU had requested reports, investigatory files, personnel, and disciplinary records related to adverse employment action against the former trooper.The Supreme Court ruled that the exemption cited by the Division, RSA 105:13-b, which pertains to the confidentiality of police personnel files, does not categorically prohibit disclosure of such records under the Right-to-Know Law. The court's interpretation of RSA 105:13-b is that it operates within the context of a specific criminal trial and does not prohibit disclosure in all instances or further regulate the information. Consequently, the Division's argument that the law establishes a scheme in which police personnel records may not be disclosed outside narrow exceptions was rejected.The court also found no absurdity in the coexistence of different statutory frameworks for seeking information in a police personnel file for different purposes. It ruled that the material disclosed under the Right-to-Know Law and RSA 105:13-b is tailored to the purposes of the respective laws, reflecting the different purposes served by each statutory scheme. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Boucher appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Moultonborough's (Town) motion to dismiss. He contended that: (1) the court erred in finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under RSA 41:48 (Supp. 2022); and (2) he has stated a claim for which relief may be granted. Plaintiff served as a police officer for the Town for nineteen years, mostly in a full-time capacity. At the time he filed his complaint, he most recently held the rank of sergeant. Up until the final four months of his employment, no formal disciplinary actions had been taken against him while employed by the Town’s police department. Due to his past involvement in assisting local officers to form a union, and his previous support of a candidate for police chief that the Board of Selectmen (Board) opposed, plaintiff believed the Board did not support him. In early 2020, the police chief retired and was replaced by an interim police manager “who was under the direct control of the [Board].” Shortly thereafter, plaintiff became “the subject of serial internal investigations orchestrated by” the interim manager and the lower-ranking officer “for simply attempting to conduct the ordinary business of a police Sergeant.” In total, plaintiff was subjected to four investigations over six weeks. According to plaintiff, the interim manager’s conduct “was very clearly aimed at undermining and isolating him.” In May 2021, plaintiff filed suit alleging one count of “Constructive Termination in Violation of RSA 41:48.” The court reasoned that if plaintiff “considers himself a terminated officer in violation of RSA 41:48, even if only constructively, it logically follows that he is required to follow the procedures contained within RSA 41:48.” The Town represented at oral argument that there were several processes plaintiff could have followed to attempt exhaustion, including requesting a hearing before the Board, articulating the issue to the Board, or “engaging” with the Board informally. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found none of these processes were set forth in the plain language of RSA 41:48. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court erred in its dismissal of plaintiff's case, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boucher v. Town of Moultonborough" on Justia Law

Petitioner Liberty Utilities (EnergyNorth Natural Gas) Corp., d/b/a Liberty (Liberty), appealed a New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission order denying Liberty’s request to recover development costs related to a proposed natural gas pipeline and tank system, the Granite Bridge project. This case arose from an unrealized construction project. Liberty relied solely on Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC (Tennessee Gas Pipeline) for its gas supply in southern and central New Hampshire. Liberty executives testified that Liberty sought more supply from Tennessee Gas Pipeline because Liberty was facing increased demand. Liberty and Tennessee Gas Pipeline agreed to an arrangement whereby Liberty would receive additional gas from a second pipeline, but Tennessee Gas Pipeline cancelled that arrangement. In response, Liberty began to explore other options, and eventually decided to construct its own pipeline and tank system, the Granite Bridge project. Liberty estimated that $7.5 million of that amount consisted of engineering, environmental, consulting, internal labor, commission related costs, and land costs. Despite those costs, according to Liberty, it would have been years before Liberty broke ground on Granite Bridge. Later, Tennessee Gas Pipeline offered Liberty more space on its pipeline at a cheaper rate than the projected cost of Granite Bridge. Liberty accepted that offer, and then cancelled the Granite Bridge project. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded Liberty could not recover its costs when it cancelled the project and consumers derived no benefit. The Commission's order was thus affirmed. View "Appeal of Liberty Utilities (EnergyNorth Natural Gas) Corp., D/B/A Liberty" on Justia Law

Petitioners James Beal, Mary Beth Brady, Mark Brighton, Lenore Weiss Bronson, Nancy Brown, William R. Castle, Lawrence J. Cataldo, Ramona Charland, Lucinda Clarke, Fintan Connell, Marjorie P. Crean, Ilara Donarum, Joseph R. Famularo, Jr., Philippe Favet, Charlotte Gindele, Julia Gindele, Linda Griebsch, Catherine L. Harris, Roy W. Helsel, John E. Howard, Nancy B. Howard, Elizabeth Jefferson, Cate Jones, Robert McElwain, Mary Lou McElwain, Edward Rice, April Weeks, Michael Wierbonics, and Lili Wierbonics, appealed a Housing Appeals Board (HAB) order that reversed a decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which, in turn, had reversed certain approvals granted by the Portsmouth Planning Board (Planning Board) to respondent, Iron Horse Properties, LLC (Iron Horse). Iron Horse owned real property at 105 Bartlett Street in Portsmouth. In 2021, it requested various approvals from the Planning Board in connection with its proposed redevelopment of the site: three multi-family apartment buildings with a total of 152 dwelling units. Iron Horse sought a site review permit, lot line revision permit, conditional use permit (CUP) for shared parking, and a wetland CUP. The Planning Board granted the approvals, and the petitioners, describing themselves as “a group of abutters and other concerned citizens,” then filed an appeal with the ZBA. The ZBA granted the appeal, effectively reversing the Planning Board’s site plan and CUP approvals. Following denial of its motion for rehearing, Iron Horse then appealed the ZBA’s decision to the HAB. The HAB reversed the ZBA’s findings as to six of the petitioners’ claims and dismissed the remaining three claims. Petitioners took their appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, raising a number of issues that were consolidated under two overarching questions: (1) whether Iron Horse’s proposed project met the six criteria for a wetland CUP set forth in section 10.1017.50 of the Portsmouth Zoning Ordinance; and (2) whether Iron Horse’s permit requests were barred under the doctrine of Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980). Finding no reversible error in the HAB’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Beal, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Bradley Weiss and Cathleen Shea appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Sunapee's (Town) motion to dismiss. The trial court determined that, because plaintiffs failed to request a second rehearing from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over their appeal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded: pursuant to RSA 677:3, plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the superior court from the ZBA’s April 1 denial by timely moving for rehearing. View "Weiss, et al. v. Town of Sunapee" on Justia Law