Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A district court has broad discretion to decide whether and when to grant an agency's request for a voluntary remand. But a voluntary remand is typically appropriate only when the agency intends to revisit the challenged agency decision on review. After the Department rejected Limnia's two loan applications, Limnia filed suit alleging that the Department's rejection of Limnia's applications was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court then granted the Department's voluntary remand request. The DC Circuit held that the district court erred by granting the Department's request for a voluntary remand in this case because the Department did not intend to revisit the original application decisions under review. Therefore, the DC Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Limnia, Inc. v. DOE" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the Bureau's withholding of water well location and depth information under Exemption 9 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(9), holding that Exemption 9 permits the government to withhold information and maps disclosing the locations and depth of certain water wells. The depth and location of wells straightforwardly qualifies as "geological and geophysical information," and providing the well-depth and location information to AquAlliance would thus necessarily disclose geological or geophysical information. View "AquAlliance v. United States Bureau of Reclamation" on Justia Law

Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. 824a-3, seeks to reduce reliance on fossil fuels by increasing the number of energy-efficient cogeneration and small power-production facilities. Oregon implements its PURPA responsibilities largely through its Public Utility Commission (OPUC), which has directed utilities subject to its jurisdiction to draft off-the-shelf, standard-form power-purchase agreements that OPUC then reviews for compliance with PURPA. OPUC has approved two standard-form power-purchase agreements submitted by petitioner Portland General Electric. Petitioner PáTu Wind Farm, a six-turbine, nine-megawatt generator in rural Oregon, is classified under PURPA as a small power producer. This appeal stems from the parties' dispute over the nature of Portland General's purchase obligation. The Commission ruled that under PURPA, Portland General must purchase all of PáTu’s power, though it rejected PáTu’s insistence that Portland General do so by utilizing a technology known as dynamic scheduling. The court concluded that PáTu’s petition dealing exclusively with Portland's refusal to utilize dynamic scheduling is without merit. Accordingly, the court denied PáTu’s petition. The court dismissed Portland's petition challenging the Commission's ruling that it must purchase all of PáTu’s power for lack of jurisdiction because FERC's orders were advisory. View "Portland General Electric Comp v. FERC" on Justia Law

CFPB filed a petition to enforce a civil investigative demand, seeking information relating to unlawful acts and practices in connection with accrediting for-profit colleges. The district court denied the petition. The court affirmed, concluding that the civil investigative demand (CID) did not comply with the governing statute, 12 U.S.C. 5562(c)(2). In this case, pursuant to section 5562(c)(2), the CID failed to advise ACICS of the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable to such violation. View "CFPB v. Accrediting Council For Independent Colleges and Schools" on Justia Law

CREW filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, after the FBI declined to provide requested information related to former House of Representatives Majority Leader Tom DeLay. On appeal, CREW challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for the DOJ and denial of CREW's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The district court concluded that Exemption 5 shielded certain FBI correspondence and that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) could be invoked to protect names and other personal information contained in responsive records. The court concluded that the Government's assertion of Exemption 5 was untimely and, before ruling on Exemptions 6 and 7(C), a more particularized balancing of the interests was required. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Allied, a commercial airline fuel service provider, challenged the Board's decision that Allied violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by failing to recognize and bargain with the Union. The court held that Allied's petition failed to establish jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.; a constitutionally adequate Board panel's certification of the Union as the employees' representative cured any defect in the Board's earlier order; and substantial evidence supports the Board's statutory-supervisor classifications. The court concluded that the Board's decision was legally correct and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Allied Aviation Service Comp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commissions' determinations following compliance filings by the regional transmission organization for New England's electric grid. The court concluded that the Transmission Owners have standing to bring their challenges, but concluded that the Commission's orders were not inconsistent with its past decisions; the Commission did not apply the wrong legal standard for measuring whether the Mobile-Sierra presumption had been overcome; and the Commission's determination was in accord with the evidence before it. In regard to State Petitioner's challenges, the court concluded that, in light of the clarifications made by the Commission, there is no inconsistency with Order No. 1000. The court also concluded that the Commission did not exceed its bounds of authority under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824(a). Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Emera Maine v. FERC" on Justia Law

Transmissions Owners provide transmission services for customers in New England. Consumers, Massachusetts and various consumer-side stakeholders, filed suit under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e(a), alleging that Transmission Owners' base return on equity (ROE) had become unjust and unreasonable. At issue are FERC's orders in the section 206 proceeding. Both Transmission Owners and Customers filed petitions for review challenging whether FERC satisfied the statutory requirements under section 206 in setting a new ROE. The court explained that, to satisfy its dual burden under section 206, FERC was required to do more than show that its single ROE analysis generated a new just and reasonable ROE and conclusively declare that, consequently, the existing ROE was per se unjust and unreasonable. Therefore, the court concluded that, because FERC's single ROE analysis failed to include an actual finding as to the lawfulness of Transmission Owners' existing base ROE, FERC acted arbitrarily and outside of its statutory authority in setting a new base ROE for Transmission Owners. The court also concluded that FERC failed to provide any reasoned basis for selecting 10.57 percent as the new base ROE. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review, vacated FERC's orders, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maine v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Services issued a Final Rule in 2012 designating 9.5 million acres of federal forest lands in California, Oregon, and Washington as critical habitat for the northern spotted owl. The Council filed suit challenging the legality of the critical habitat designation. The court concluded, in light of its decision in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, that the Council had standing to challenge the designation because it has demonstrated a substantial probability that the critical habitat designation will cause a decrease in the supply of timber from the designated forest lands, that Council members obtain their timber from those forest lands, and that Council members will suffer economic harm as a result of the decrease in the timber supply from those forest lands. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision stating otherwise and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carpenters Industrial Council v. Zinke" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9603, and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 11004, require parties to notify authorities when large quantities of hazardous materials are released into the environment. In 2008, the EPA issued a final rule that generally exempts farms from CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements for air released from animal waste. The EPA reasoned that the reports were unnecessary because, in most cases, federal response was impractical and unlikely. The court concluded that petitioners have informational standing and proceeded to the merits. The court granted the petition for review and vacated the Final Rule, concluding that the EPA's action cannot be justified either as a reasonable interpretation of any statutory ambiguity or implementation of a de minimis exception. The Pork Producers' challenge was moot and the court dismissed their petition. View "Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA" on Justia Law